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 The interaction between the President and Congress is many times quite public and well 
documented (Cronin 1980; Covington et al. 1995; Fisher 1994; Schlesinger 2004). Similarly, 
relations between the Congress and the Supreme Court are well documented; Congress makes 
law and, if requested, the Court interprets it. The interaction between the president and the Court, 
however, is not nearly as well defined, and certainly not as public. Supreme Court cases 
involving the president directly are fairly rare. King and Meernik (1995) identify 347 cases 
involving the foreign policy powers of the president, decided from 1790 to 1996, which is 
roughly 1.5 cases per calendar year. This study will examine the influence of attitudinal and 
extra-attitudinal factors on the individual level decision-making of the U.S. Supreme Court 
justices in cases involving presidential power. By using both attitudinal and extra-attitudinal 
factors, such as public opinion and armed conflict, this study will explore the limitations of a 
simple attitudinal model in complex and highly salient cases such as those that involve 
presidential power. The cases to be examined will be all presidential power cases decided from 
1949 to 2005 (N = 38). The unit of analysis will, however, be the justice’s individual-level vote 





This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my father. I never expected blackjack and craps would 
get me this far. 
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CHAPTER ONE: SEPERATION OF POWERS THEORETICAL 
GROUNDING 
Theoretical Grounding 
 The relationship between the United States Supreme Court and the presidency is certainly 
one that has not followed a singular trend.  Broad generalizations about interactions between the 
two institutions are unable to encompass fully the complexities of their inter-branch relationship 
(King and Meernik 1999).  The difficulties of explaining the relationship between these two 
branches of government stems from their origin.  Originating from the Constitution with very 
little in the way of guidance of enumerated powers unlike their legislative counterparts, both the 
presidency and the Supreme Court each had to find their own way in regards to gaining power 
(Hamilton et al. 1788; Pritchett 1949).  The powers and duties of the presidency are discussed in 
Article II of the Constitution, which contains only four sections, in comparison to the ten 
sections discussing the powers and duties of the Congress.  In the four sections dealing with the 
presidency, Section 1 deals with the president’s selection and Section 4 with the removal of the 
president, while the other two only enumerate nine distinctive powers.  Similarly, Article III, 
which concerns the federal judiciary, contains three sections, the bulk of which discuss the areas 
in which the courts will have jurisdiction, but provide no guidance as to the adjudication of 
actual cases.  Therefore, interactions between the two branches are largely informal, except for 
two distinct venues in which each actor has the power to vastly influence the other. 
  The president has the constitutional charge to appoint justices to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
stemming from Article II, Section 2, thus theoretically modifying the ideological composition of 
the Court (Segal and Spaeth 2002).  The other venue in which the branches directly interact is 
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not specifically enumerated; it has been created directly from the developmental process of the 
two branches.  While the president attempts to extend his institutional power in order to 
compensate for the minimal powers that the Constitution grants him, the Supreme Court has an 
obligation that stems from the ruling that the Court articulated in Marbury v. Madison (1803), 
which asserted the Supreme Court as the final interpretative authority regarding the Constitution.  
When a case involving presidential power comes before the Supreme Court, it is a potential 
challenge to both institutions’ legitimacy in that the Court, having no executive authority of its 
own, must rely upon the executive branch, the arm of the president, to enforce a decision that 
could in effect take power away from that office (Epstein and Knight 1998).1  Considering how 
high the stakes are for both institutions, the process of decision-making for the Court should be a 
complex one.  The focus of this thesis will be to examine the factors that affect the individual 
decisions of each U.S. Supreme Court justice in cases involving the Office of the President. 
Importance of This Research 
 The interaction between the President and Congress is many times quite public and well 
documented (e.g., Cronin 1980; Covington et al. 1995; Fisher 1994; Schlesinger 2004).  
Similarly, relations between the Congress and the Supreme Court are well documented; 
Congress makes law and, if properly requested, the Court may interpret it.  The interaction 
between the president and the Court, however, is not nearly as well defined, and certainly not as 
public.  Supreme Court cases involving the president directly are relatively rare.  King and 
Meernik (1995) identify 347 cases involving the foreign policy powers of the president, from 
                                                 
1 As Alexander Hamilton noted in Federalist #78, “The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the 
sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active 
resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments” (Clinton 1961: 78). 
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1790 to 1996, which is roughly 1.5 cases per calendar year.  It is helpful to consider the 
interactions between the Supreme Court and the president in terms of a separation of powers 
game, in which each branch of government acts strategically to maximize their goals (Epstein 
and Knight 1998).  Possible interactions in a separation of powers game could include the 
president’s refusing to enforce the Court’s decisions or the Court’s limiting the legal power of 
the presidency through case law. 
 A separation of powers game assumes that each party (the Supreme Court, Congress, and 
the president) is a rational actor able to rank their alternative goals and actively attempt to reach 
them when there is a relative lack of formal constraints.  Schubert (1959) cites President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt’s 1937 Court-packing plan as an example of Supreme Court justices behaving 
strategically.  Before Roosevelt announced his plan to enlarge the size of the Court, the two most 
moderate justices, Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts, voted more consistently with the 
conservative members of the Court because they were ideologically economic conservatives 
(Schubert 1959).  Following the announcement, they began voting consistently with the liberal 
members of the Court, possibly in order to protect the legitimacy of the Court.  From this, 
Schubert argued that the justices, behaving strategically, responded to the external stimulus of 
the president’s plan and, in turn, made the decision-making of the Court more moderate so as to 
protect their institutional legitimacy, in that they thereafter ultimately upheld the legality of much 
of the New Deal legislation (Schubert 1959).  
 Since the Supreme Court and the president do not want to risk a challenge to their 
legitimacy (because a reduction is either institution’s legitimacy would make it more difficult for 
either to act consistently with their policy goals), controversies involving presidential power are 
seldom heard by the Court.  For each institution, legitimacy allows them to carry out their goals 
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efficiently.  There is no appeal once the Court has ruled; for the president, it would clearly be a 
defeat.  For the Court, deciding against a president could foster public dissent against the Court, 
impugning its legitimacy, as it has few formal powers.2  It seems curious then why either party 
would ever allow a case to reach the Court, yet they do.  A study of how the individual justices 
make their decisions in such cases would be quite telling in that these decisions change the 
balance of power within the federal government and, thus, the nation overall. 
 Segal and Spaeth (2002), proponents of the attitudinal model (which seeks to predict U.S. 
Supreme Court justices’ votes in cases by their own individual ideology) – the current 
predominant model of judicial decision-making, criticize all rational choice theory. They note 
that, “while specific rational choice models can be falsified, as scholars invariably state goals 
assumed to motivate their specific models, rational choice theory itself, for the most part, cannot 
be” (Segal and Spaeth 2002: 98).  They argue this because the predictive power of the theory 
rests upon the assumption that individuals behave rationally in order to seek their goals and this 
assumption cannot be empirically tested.  Rational choice, the foundation of formal separation of 
power games, theorizes that individuals act rationally to reach goals and may engage in strategic 
behavior, forgoing immediate gratification in order to receive long-term utility.  Segal and 
Spaeth (2002) argue that because rational choice theory must always operate without having 
complete information about the ultimate goal preferences of the actor involved and without 
complete information regarding what led the actor to make a certain decision, rational choice 
theory cannot be empirically supported.  Incomplete information, it would seem, would 
ultimately lead to the nonfalsifiability of the theory.  
                                                 
2 An example of a Separation of Power game can be found in Knight and Epstein (1996), which examines the 
circumstances surrounding Marbury v. Madison (1803) 
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 One, however, must consider that social science research always works with incomplete 
information since human decision-making is difficult to quantify precisely (Epstein and Knight 
2000).  This applies to all areas of quantifiable social science research, not simply rational choice 
theory.  To critique rational choice theory on the grounds of incomplete information, one would 
also have to call into question even the attitudinal model, since any ideological measure of the 
justices themselves must be created with incomplete information since researchers must use 
secondary sources, not the justices themselves, in order to create the measure.  The main 
ideological measure used with the attitudinal model are the Segal/Cover scores (Segal and Cover 
1989).  These scores measure the ideology of the U.S. Supreme Court justices by completing a 
content analysis of newspaper editorials from the time the individual was nominated through 
their conformation.  While these measures have been shown to have significant predictive power 
with regards to individual level vote choice, they certainly are not complete information with 
regard to the justices’ ideologies.  In short, if all social science research, including the attitudinal 
model, operated with complete information in their analyses there would be no need for error 
term present in each calculation.  
 Taking into account all the possibilities of the separation of power game, some of which 
are quite detrimental to the Court, it would seem quite unlikely that justices would vote their 
sincere policy preferences without considering some external factors.  A Court’s not acting 
strategically, and its acting solely on the basis of personal policy preferences, would frequently 
conflict with the other branches of government and the public (Epstein and Knight 1998).  If they 
simply voted their sincere attitudes, there is a possibility they could offend the public or the 
executive, triggering a separation of powers game, which it would be in their strategic interest to 
avoid.  Stated another way, the Court operates within institutional constraints.  This is not to say 
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the justices will not consider their own ideology in the decision, but it would be atheoretical to 
assume the justices decide cases in a political vacuum (Epstein and Knight 1998).  Other possible 
factors that may influence their decisions are presidential popularity, whether the president is of 
the same relative ideology as the justice, whether the president appointed tat justice, and if the 
justice has prior executive experience before joining the Court, among others. 
 Furthermore, when thinking about case type, all cases may not be viewed similarly.  The 
Constitution gives the executive more power in foreign policy than domestic policy.  Pursuant to 
the president’s Article II powers, the office has nine enumerated powers, of which only the 
power to grant pardons and reprieves, the power to deliver the state of the union, and the charge 
to faithfully execute the laws deal with domestic powers.  The Supreme Court, following the cue 
of Article II, Section 2 (which gives the presidential office a wide breadth of foreign policy 
powers) should be more likely to rule for the president in cases which involve those powers, such 
as in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright (1936) in which Justice Sutherland stated, “the president alone has 
the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”3   Thus, when considering case 
type, the justices are expected to be more deferential to the president in the realm of foreign 
policy.  Also, if the country is involved in an armed conflict, the Supreme Court may experience 
a “rally around the flag” effect (a situation in which public opinion and the Congress is 
temporarily more highly supportive of the president), not unlike the rest of the nation.4 
 Essentially knowing what factors may influence a justice’s vote choice in a case will help 
                                                 
3 Justice Sutherland also quoted John Marshall who said before the House of Representatives, “the President is the 
sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. Of consequence, the 
demand of a foreign nation can only be made on him. He possesses the whole Executive power. He holds and directs 
the force of the nation. Of consequence, any act to be performed by the force of the nation is to be performed 
through him.” (1800) 
4 See, for example, Mueller (1973) and Lee (1977) 
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us to better understand not only the behavior of the Supreme Court, but also the behavior of the 
president when it comes to deciding on what cases he believes are important enough to risk being 
losing in the nation’s highest court, especially if he is more likely to lose in some cases rather 
than others (Wildavsky 1966, 1989).  It is important to study this relationship between the 
president and the Court not only because it lacks a more rigorous examination, but also because 
both branches of the government rely upon each in the system of checks and balances (e.g. the 
current debate on eavesdropping). The Supreme Court can restrict the relative power of the 
president or extend it, while the president can choose to enforce the Court’s decisions.  This is 
not only a separation of powers game, but one that could turn the balance of power within the 
federal government, making it an issue quite important to study. 
Literature Review 
 There is already a substantial canon of literature examining how and why Supreme Court 
justices behave when it comes to decision-making.  Traditionally, dating back to the times of 
Roman codified law, judges were thought of as impartial arbiters who decided each case based 
upon the rule of law (Wold 1974).  This view of judges was mirrored by one of the nations 
founders, Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist 78.  Hamilton wrote of the Supreme Court justices, 
“they ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are 
not fundamental” (Clinton 1961: 78).  In describing his view of the Court, Hamilton saw a body 
that would make its decisions on the basis of supremacy of one law to another.  This traditional 
view of decision-making was the predominant model of judicial behavior up until the emergence 
of the “Legal Realists” in the 1920s, who sought to describe how the Court actually behaved.  
The Realists envisioned judicial behavior in the terms of how cases were actually decided, not in 
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the terms of law and precedent.  Pritchett (1968, 487) noted, “the [L]egal [R]ealists, influenced 
by pragmatism, behavioral psychology, psychoanalysis, and statistical sociology, sought reality 
in human behavior and judicial conduct.  They believed that judicial decision-making may be 
influenced by the ‘hunches’ of judges, and that close cases are commonly decided on the basis of 
extra-legal factors.”  Hence, the legal realists were some of the first researchers to examine the 
Court not solely on the basis of legal output and content, but in order to determine how the Court 
reached that legal output using both legal and extra-legal factors. 
 Emerging from the legal realist movement, C. Herman Pritchett, a political scientist, 
examined the Court with an eye to the politics of each situation by taking into account the 
political and partisan climate of the time.  This prospective was unique at the time, in that 
previous analysts had not considered the effect of partisanship or public opinion on the Court’s 
decision-making. This unique view helped steer the course of scholarly literature toward more 
modern scientific ways of examining the Court.  Pritchett (1949) discussed the behavior of the 
Court when it, as an institution, interacts with the presidency.  He noted that the Vinson Court 
would be unlikely to, “exercise significant influence on the boundaries of presidential power in 
the future,” (91) because of the conservative ideology of the Court’s members.  Pritchett, 
identifying the Vinson Court as more reserved concerning executive power rulings than other 
Courts while also considering the seeming improbability of a future war, reasoned, using extra-
legal cues, such as ideology of the Court and the popularity of the president, that the Court would 
not significantly influence presidential power. 
 Following the legal realists and Pritchett, came researchers commonly termed as “judicial 
behavioralists.”  Judicial behavioralists, following in the path of the legal realists, sought not 
only to explain judicial decision-making, but to generate theories that would further the study of 
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the field.  These theories were testable and falsifiable using quantitative techniques and the 
scientific method (Schubert 1968).  This movement was incremental, and much of the early 
empirical research on the judiciary had a foot in both camps; the Legal Realists and the judicial 
behavioralists (e.g., Pritchett 1948).  The movement from legal realism to judicial behavioralism 
traces it beginning to the formal articulation of empirically falsifiable theories. 
 Schubert’s (1965) study is the theoretical bridge between the work of the legal realists 
and that of the more recent judicial behavioralists in that he was the first researcher in the 
subfield to build large-scale theories and empirically test them.  While simply describing early in 
his career how the Court operates,5 Schubert quickly moved forward using quantitative 
techniques to revolutionize the study of judicial behavior (Maveety 2003).  Schubert (1965) 
argues that Supreme Court justices’ decisions in all cases are a function of their social, 
economic, and political values.  Employing factor analysis, multidimensional scaling and 
Guttman scaling, Schubert analyzed the selection of cases to determine an “i-point,” or 
ideological score, for individual justices that represented their most preferred ideology in a two-
dimensional space.  Schubert finds that the political (conservative to liberal) and economic 
liberalism (laissez-faire to government controlled) dimensions explain the justices’ votes for the 
majority of cases heard from the late 1940s through the early 1960s.  This work was equally 
innovative in terms of its theoretical and methodological techniques, and most of the continuing 
work in the subfield follows in its path.6
 Continuing on the same theoretical path as Schubert, in that they adhered to the theory 
that the justice’s personal ideology influenced their decision-making, Rohde and Spaeth (1976) 
                                                 
5 See Schubert (1950, 1953) 
6 Schubert (1974) updated his empirical techniques, yet came to similar results. 
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argue that justices’ main goal is policy making, and accordingly, they will vote based on their 
ideological opinions (which Rohde and Spaeth call “attitudes”) when cases arise in which they 
hold an opinion.  Segal and Spaeth (2002) argue that there is only one factor to consider when 
examining Supreme Court decision-making in all cases: the attitudinal model proscribes that 
when justices are casting a vote on any case, they simply consider their own ideology or attitude 
on the particular subject being adjudicated.  Segal and Spaeth argue that because members of the 
U.S.  Supreme Court have life tenure and are shielded from other aspects of politics (namely, 
electoral concerns and public opinion), that they can make decisions based completely on their 
ideology, discounting even precedent or law as the latter are malleable to essentially any of their 
goals.7
 While the fact of life tenure is empirically supported, the thought that Supreme Court 
justices are completely shielded from politics is now being re-examined.8  Considering that 
Easton (1953, 1957) defined “politics” as the “authoritative allocation of values,” and the 
Supreme Court is, thus, seen as a policy-making body, the idea that justices are shielded from 
political concerns is theoretically inconsistent.  Much research has shown that the public is aware 
of Supreme Court decisions, if only those that are salient.  Barnum (1985: 662) concludes that:  
The data also suggest that the post-New Deal Supreme Court did not necessarily 
defy the preferences of the majority when, in order to overturn legislation or 
protect minorities, it would have been obliged to do so. The Court either refrained 
from ruling or ruled equivocally on four issues of minority rights—busing, 
preferential treatment of minorities, legalization of marijuana, and legalization of 
homosexual activity—on which public opinion was highly negative. 
 
                                                 
7 Spriggs and Hansford (2001) argue that two legal norms influence the Court’s decision-making as well, but the 
legal model will be untested in this research. 
8 See Lanier (2003), Link (1995), Yates and Whitford (1998), Yates (2002) 
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Thus, the argument that the Court is a counter-majoritarian institution, or an institution that acts 
against the majority’s will, appears not to be empirically supported (Dahl 1957).  If the Court 
were a counter-majoritarian institution, it would act consistently against the common will of the 
public, but Barnum falsifies the theory.  Indeed, he finds much the opposite in that the Court 
does not decide against public opinion in general, and in the instances where it does, the trend of 
public opinion is thus changing.    Barnum examined trend rates of public opinion and found a 
correlation between an increasing trend in public opinion and decision-making. 
 Acknowledging Barnum (1985), a logical extra-attitudinal factor which justices may take 
cues from is public opinion.  Mishler and Sheehan (1993) show, using multivariate regression, 
that the U.S. Supreme Court is directly and indirectly affected by public opinion.  By “directly,” 
Mishler and Sheehan are referring to lagged measures of public opinion.   They find that when 
controlling for other traditional predictors of individual level decision-making, a lagged measure 
of public opinion (typically around five years) produces a statistically significant effect on the 
Court’s decision-making.  Mishler and Sheehan (1993: 96) state that, “although the Court’s 
decisions are driven substantially by the ideologies of its members, fluctuations in the ideological 
tenor of public opinion and in the ideological and partisan orientations of the president and 
Congress are also important.”   While “indirectly” refers to the nature of the nomination process, 
because it is presumable that the nominee will be ideologically similar to the president and the 
Congress.  Mishler and Sheehan (1996: 198) summarize their argument: 
public opinion has important direct as well as indirect effects upon the Court.  
Although this conclusion is inconsistent with a naïve attitudinal model that 
assumes the impossibility of individual change, it is fully consistent with a more 
sophisticated model in which attitudes are conceived as one of the important 
determinants of behavior, and public opinion induced changes in judicial attitudes 
are one of the important dynamics underlying aggregate changes in Supreme 
Court decisions.  
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While the Court will occasionally rule contrary to public opinion, over time according to Barnum 
(1985) and Mishler and Sheehan (1993; 1996), the Court is cognizant of public opinion and rules 
consistent with it or at least not inconsistent with it.9   
 In a similar vein, Durr, Martin, and Wolbrecht (2000) find that in the rare circumstances 
when the Court rules contrary to public sentiment, public support for the Court declines.  Taking 
Barnum (1985) and Durr et al. (2000) in conjunction, it would appear that some individual 
justices, those closer to ideologically moderate, pay attention to public opinion, and do so 
because there are consequences to the institutional legitimacy of the Court if they do not, where 
others who are closer to the ideological extremes are less concerned with public support.  As 
Durr et al. (2000, 775) conclude, “the Supreme Court may be shielded from direct electoral 
accountability, but our analysis here suggests that the public does punish the Court’s divergence 
from its preferences, not at the ballot box, but by depleting one of its most valuable resources, 
the support of the American people.”  Hence, there is an indeed a threat to the legitimacy of the 
Court in the form of public opinion, so one would expect, as Mishler and Sheehan (1993, 1996) 
found, that members of the Court closer to the ideological center are somewhat responsive to 
public opinion.  Therefore, it is theoretically consistent to propose median justices will be more 
malleable when it comes to public opinion than those who are more polar in their ideologies. 
 The presidency, however, is held accountable in two ways: at the ballot box and by the 
American people.  Presidential power has been, and will continue to be, a perennial topic in 
political science (e.g., Lee 1977; Meernik 1995; Mueller 1973; Partell 1997; Peterson 1994; 
Wildavsky 1966).  Every president seeks to bring his/her philosophy on governing to shape 
                                                 
9 See also Mishler and Sheehan (1993, 1996) and Link (1995) 
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policy however; each president is limited in what he can do to extend his power during his time 
period.  Taking into account how supportive the Congress is of the president, there is a large 
degree of variance in the power and influence each president could wield legally on both 
domestic and international situations (Nelson 2003).  Therefore, it has been difficult for scholars 
to develop a unified theory that systematically measures presidential power.  Neustadt (1990) 
argues that the most successful presidents in the post-WWII era are those who do not rely solely 
on their legal powers of the office, but those who use their substantial powers to persuade.  This 
power to persuade is not limited to the public, but it can be used to influence those members of 
Congress and also justices of the Court (Kernell 1997).  His ability to persuade those around him 
(Congress, his advisors, foreign nations, and the press) is tantamount to his being able to 
command.  A president with far-ranging persuasive powers is able to convince persons that his 
interest is theirs as well.  For Neustadt (1990, 40), "the essence of a President's persuasive task, 
with congressmen and everybody else, is to induce them to believe that what he wants of them is 
what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their own interest, 
not his."  Hence, with regards to the United States Supreme Court, the president can work as a 
thought leader for the nation, convincing the public, and, in turn, the Court that his interest is 
also their own. 
 Neustadt also argues that to a lesser degree, presidents must also make use of their power 
to command.  A president’s power to command stems from those acts that the executive has been 
granted legal authority to carry out either from the Constitution, an act of Congress, or the 
implied consent of Congress or the States.  As Justice Jackson noted in his concurring opinion in 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), “when the President acts pursuant to an 
express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all 
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that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.  In these circumstances, 
and only in these, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify federal sovereignty.”  
Hence, the president’s power to command is dependent upon the implicit or implied delegation 
of Congress if it does not stem directly from the U.S. Constitution. 
 King and Meernik (1999) address the president’s power to command in an examination 
of Supreme Court cases involving the president’s foreign policy powers.  They investigate two 
hypotheses that the Supreme Court does not issue decisions in many cases that involve the 
foreign policy powers of the president because the Constitution of the United States gives the 
president more power in foreign policy powers than domestic and that, when the Court does 
issue a decision, it is more often than not in favor of the president.  In testing to the first 
hypothesis, King and Meernik, using stringent coding rules, create a database of all cases 
involving the president’s foreign policy powers.10  They review 347 cases decided from 1790 to 
1996.  While not a large number when considering the total number of cases that the Court has 
decided, it certainly is a large enough number to rebut the assumption that the foreign policy 
powers of the president are adjudicated rarely.  Testing the second hypothesis, King and Meernik 
argue that there are types of cases in the realm of foreign power that the president is more likely 
to lose than others because they arise from situations in which the presidents’ power is 
questionable in regards to the law.  Creating dummy variables for each type of case they identify, 
they assess that in the cases that are decided on the basis of civil liberties, or cases on which the 
Constitution or relevant statutes are silent concerning the issue at hand, the president is indeed 
                                                 
10 They searched the WESTLAW database for all cases decided from 1790 to 1996 and initially found around 750 
cases.  After reading the majority opinions and rejected those cases which only tangentially referenced foreign 
policy, the researchers only kept the cases if an executive official argued the case in front of the Court or if they 
submitted an amicus brief on behalf of the president.  
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more likely to lose than cases decided base on specifically delegated powers of the president, 
such as his war powers or his treaty powers.  King and Meernik, however, do not consider other 
factors as possible explanatory options, such as whether the country was engaged in an armed 
conflict or if a justice’s ideology coincided with presidential ideology.  Ultimately, King and 
Meernik show how the Court has ruled, but not why it did so. 
 Traditionally, those analysts investigating a link between presidential influence and the 
Supreme Court considered the appointment process as the only means by which a president had 
any hope of influencing the decisions of the Supreme Court because, once on the Court, 
individual justices are shielded from political and electoral concerns as discussed earlier.  This 
theory has been termed “judicial replacement” and asserts that the president can positively affect 
the Court’s decision-making outcomes, but only indirectly through the role of appointments 
(Norpoth and Segal 1994).  Through appointments, the president can influence the ideology of 
the Court and, in turn, the way that the justices vote in cases.  Those who tout the theory of 
“judicial replacement” claim that the only linkage between the Court’s opinions and the public’s 
preferences lie within confirmation process, to which the justices are subjected (Dahl 1957).  It is 
argued that the Senators and elected office-holders, are representative of the public’s opinions 
and, therefore, those judges who complete the nominating process may share similar opinions to 
the public (Norpoth and Segal 1994).  The theory of judicial replacement is closely tied to the 
attitudinal model as both argue that once on the Court, justices consider no external factors, only 
their individual ideologies, because they are shielded from political concerns since their office is 
life-tenured and their decisions are unable to be easily nullified.  Therefore, according to 
proponents of the judicial replacement theory, the president only has an indirect effect on the 
outcome of the Court in any case (Dahl 1957; Funston 1975; Norpoth and Segal 1994).  
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However, Hurwitz and Stefko (2004) determine that “newcomer justices,” those recently 
confirmed to the Court, are more likely to follow legal precedent than their more senior 
colleagues.  This means that the indirect influence of the president, which Norpoth and Segal 
(1994) find, may not be instantaneous, or uniform in nature among all justices, and only appears 
following an acclimation period of some indeterminate length (Hagle 1993; Wood et al. 1998). 
 Ducat and Dudley (1989) examine presidential success rates in the Federal District 
courts. Their dataset was constructed by searching WESTLAW for the terms “executive” or 
“president” in the headnotes or as a topic.  Cases were then examined individually to assess 
content and retained only if the president or executive power was specifically discussed in the 
opinion of the Court.  This process yielded 198 cases decided from 1949 to 1984. The 
researchers then had to decide if the cases involved the president’s foreign or domestic power, 
and if the cases were decided for or against the president.  Ducat and Dudley included a variable 
which averaged the president’s approval rating, as measured by Gallup, for the three-month 
period prior to the decision being issued.  Ducat and Dudley also included variables for the party 
of the president, whether the justice deciding the case was appointed by the president in the case 
involved, and whether the justice had previous executive experience at the state or federal level.  
The results found that only the foreign/domestic variable, presidential approval, and judicial 
loyalty to their appointing president variables were statistically significant.  While these results 
are not directly applicable to president/Supreme Court relations because Federal Court judges 
may have further career aspirations (which depend upon presidential nomination), the Ducat and 
Dudley model will be used in this research with some modifications that will be discussed later. 
 This research will largely be an extension of the previous research of Yates and Whitford 
(1998) and Yates (2002).  Yates and Whitford (1998) examined whether numerous external 
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factors hold sway on the Court when it considers cases of presidential power.  By following 
similar data-gathering techniques as Ducat and Dudley, they collect 32 Supreme Court cases 
decided from 1949 to 1993, yielding 280 individual justice votes to analyze.  Yates and Whitford 
examined numerous hypotheses to test the effect of different external factors on the decision-
making process of individual justices. 
 Yates and Whitford’s (1998) first hypothesis is essentially the “two presidencies” thesis, 
first articulated by Wildavsky (1966).  Wildavsky argued that the president has two distinct 
spheres of power when dealing with Congress.  The president was theoretically expected to have 
much more influence over the Congress when discussing foreign policy issues because of the 
president’s enumerated powers in the Constitution and because of U.S. Supreme Court’s 
historical deference to the president in cases involving the foreign policy power.11  The president 
was expected to have comparably less success in cases involving domestic policy.  While 
Wildavsky examined the executive’s relative success rates in Congress, Yates and Whitford 
hypothesize that a justice will be more likely to vote in favor of the president if the case deals 
with foreign or military powers because the Constitution in Article II, Section 2 and federal 
statutes (such as the ones adjudicated in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright (1936) and Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952)) in which the president is given considerable more power in the realm 
of foreign and military powers. 
 Yates and Whitford (1998) next propose the presidential approval hypothesis.  It states 
that the president’s approval rating should be positively related to a justice’s vote in his favor. 
They hypothesize this because if justices are responding to external cues, such as public opinion 
                                                 
11 For example, Korematsu  v. U.S. (1944), Lichter v. U.S. (1948), and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 
(1952) 
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(Mishler and Sheehan 1993, 1996), in a case involving the president, it would it would be 
theoretically consistent to assume some justices would review the president’s approval rating for 
a cue as to how to vote in the case.  If some justices consider public opinion and are unlikely to 
buck prevailing public sentiment, it would be likely to conclude that in cases involving the 
president, they would also consider his popularity as a cue to determine how to decide in a given 
case. 
 Yates and Whitford’s third hypothesis asserts that on the basis of partisan identification, a 
justice will be more likely to rule for or against the president.  Depending on the 
operationalization of the variable, Yates and Whitford test two different versions of the justice 
party affiliation hypothesis, in order to retain continuity with previous research and to attempt to 
show the short-comings of previous operationalizations.  The first version tested in Ducat and 
Dudley (1989) stated that Democratic Supreme Court Justices would be more likely to support 
extensions of presidential power than Republican justices.  Ducat and Dudley tested the 
hypothesis in this manner because they agreed with the “savior” model of the presidency.  The 
“savior” model of the presidency is associated with Franklin Delano Roosevelt and, as Nelson 
(2003, 3) described, “the model’s underlying rationale is the president is the chief guardian of the 
national interest, not only in foreign policy but also in domestic affairs…”.  This rationale 
ultimately was time-bound as the political parties’ policy preferences have changed over time.  
Since Democrats were associated with Roosevelt and the “savior” model of the presidency, 
Ducat and Dudley hypothesize that Democrat justices will be more likely to rule for the 
president.  The second version of this hypothesis, the one tested in Yates and Whitford (1998), 
states that a justice’s affiliation with the Democratic party should be negatively related with the 
likelihood that a justice will vote in favor of presidential power because Democrats have become 
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more recently suspicious of presidential extensions of power.  Yates and Whitford test the 
hypothesis in this way because they believe in the post-WWII era, Democrats became wary of 
the vast powers of the president after the conflict in Vietnam and the abuses of Watergate 
(Thomas and Pika 1996) and, therefore, expected Democrat justices would be more likely to vote 
against the president in cases of presidential power. 
 Yates and Whitford’s fourth hypothesis is termed the “judicial appointment” hypothesis 
and proposes that if a justice has been appointed by the current president, that justice will be 
more likely to vote in favor of presidential power in deference to the president who appointed 
him/her.  In addition to the simple assertion that a justice will be preferential to the president who 
nominated them out of patronage, Tate (1981) and Tate and Handberg (1991) offer an additional 
theory:  they argue that presidents, who have definite policy goals, will nominate justices who 
have similar goals, or at the least similar ideologies.  Therefore, not simply out of patronage will 
a justice decide for their nominating president, but also because the president and the justice 
should share similar ideologies and policy goals that may influence the justice’s decision-
making. 
 The fifth hypothesis identified is the “same party” hypothesis and proposes that if the 
justice is of the same party as the president, that justice is more likely to vote in favor of 
presidential power as a factor of partisan unity.12  The fifth hypothesis is tested in an extended 
model which uses the Segal-Cover (1989) ideology scores. These scores, created for each 
individual justice since Earl Warren, place each justice on an ideological continuum ranging 
from -1 (most conservative) to +1 (most liberal).  The Segal-Cover scores were developed by 
                                                 
12 There is a possibility for multicollinearity between hypotheses four and five.  However, the hypotheses measure 
distinctly different theories and if multicollinearity exists between the variables, it is not expected to affect the 
model.  This will be examined in my own analysis. 
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completing a textual analysis of newspaper editorials from the time a justice was nominated 
through the Senate’s conformation. These values were originally developed for use with civil 
rights cases, but other researchers have used them with limited success in different types of cases 
(Arrington and Brenner 2004; Segal et al. 1995; Yates and Whitford 1998; Yates 2002; but see 
Epstein and Mershon 1996).13
 The final hypothesis, called the “executive experience” hypothesis, states that if a justice 
has had prior executive experience in a post at the state or federal level (e.g., Attorney General’s 
office, state governor, etc.), he/she will be more likely to support presidential power because the 
justice will be familiar with the challenges of an executive office, and thus, may be more willing 
to extend the president power.  Tate (1981) and Tate and Handberg (1991) each articulate similar 
theories regarding executive experience. 
 In the first model tested, what Yates and Whitford (1998) term the “Supreme Court 
Model” (543) (which is the same as Ducat and Dudley’s (1989) model), only two variables 
coefficient estimates were statistically significant and, thus, lend support to the hypotheses that 
they tested.  The foreign/military coefficient, which measures case type, is positively signed and 
statistically significant, lending support to the “two presidencies” hypothesis, thus showing that 
justices are more likely to rule for the president in cases that involve his foreign policy powers.  
The justices’ party affiliation variable is negative correlated and also statistically significant, 
which lends support to Yates and Whitford’s hypothesis that a justice’s identification with the 
Democratic party would be negatively correlated with a vote in favor of presidential power at in 
least in more contemporary times. 
                                                 
13 Epstein and Mershon (1996) caution against using the Segal-Cover scores for other types of cases than they were 
developed however.  Since this research will be an extension of Yates and Whitford (1998) who successfully 
employed the measures, this problem is unforeseen.  
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 In the second model tested, the Extended Model (545), the same hypotheses were tested, 
but the way in which two of them are specified had been modified.  The justice’s party variable 
has been replaced by a justice ideology variable, and measured along the Segal-Cover ideology 
scale, which is a more precise measure than a simple, dichotomous party identification.  The 
second variable replaced is the presidential approval variable.  It was originally measured by 
averaging all Gallop polls concerning presidential approval for three months before the decision.  
This is the manner in which Ducat and Dudley measured presidential approval.  Yates and 
Whitford (1998) operationalize their measure in a different way.  They use the same three month 
period, but take the difference of the first and last Gallop poll, instead of a three month average.  
Yates and Whitford argue that measuring presidential approval in this way captures the trend of 
presidential opinion at the time of the decision rather than averaging out the period, which 
smoothes out any fluctuations.   This Extended Model finds three variables coefficient estimates 
that reach statistical significance.  Again, the foreign/military variable is positive and statistically 
significant.  The justice ideology variable is negative (as was the justice’s party variable in the 
original model) and statistically significant.  The approval trend variable is positive and 
statistically significant.  This extended model improves upon the original model’s percent 
reduction of error (PRE).14  The original model’s PRE was 11.1, while the Extended Model has a 
PRE of 13.5.  Therefore, while the variables in the Extended Model measure the same concepts 
as in the original model, they are measured in a more precise way by using continuous measures 
(Segal-Cover scores) and a better operationalization of public opinion trend, which increases 
their predictive value. 
                                                 
14 The PRE measure tells a reader that by knowing the values of all the independent variables, we can better predict 
our dependent variable by that percent of. 
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 Yates and Whitford argue that the PRE measures did not perform as well as expected 
because of the inclusion of both domestic and foreign/military cases together within the same 
model.  Therefore, they estimate the Extended Model again, separating domestic cases and 
foreign policy cases.  While the two variables that were significant in the Extended Model 
originally remain significant and in their hypothesized directions, the PRE in the domestic model 
jumps to 25.3, while the foreign model declines to 11.6.  These results suggest that the external 
factors have more of an influence in cases involving domestic powers than foreign policy power 
cases. 
 Yates (2002) modifies his model by the inclusion of a new variable that increases the 
predictive power of his model.  Yates hypothesizes that if the president or his officers are the 
petitioner before the Court, the justices will be more likely to vote against the president.  Yates 
(2002) argues that in most cases, the Court has extensive discretion when deciding what cases it 
will hear.  When justices consider what cases to grant certiorari, they will most likely choose 
cases where the Court will overturn the lower court decision, thus on average ruling for the 
petitioner.  However, in high profile cases such as those involving the Office of the President, the 
Court does not have as much discretion because there is external pressure on the institution to 
resolve the controversy. Hence, in cases involving the president, the preferred decision of the 
Court will be when the president is a respondent because in this context, the Court can vote 
simultaneously to uphold presidential power and the decision of the lower court thus influencing 
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the ruling.  This variable was found to have extensive predictive power and substantially 
increases the model’s PRE to 49 percent.15
 Yates, however, missed one aspect that perennially affects decision-making at all levels 
of government:  when the United States is involved in an armed conflict, a “rally around the 
flag” effect takes place.   A “rally around the flag” effect occurs when armed conflict involving 
the United States causes public opinion of the president to rise significantly, and, thus, his 
success rates in Congress also increase (Baker and Oneal 2001; Lee 1977; Mueller 1973).  
Meernik (1995) argues that while armed conflict does not give the president a blank check on 
which to write his policy initiatives, it does have a calculable affect on public opinion.  Since 
Congress is a representative institution, and, therefore, theoretically responsive to public opinion, 
Congress may show more deference to the president in times of armed conflict.   Little research 
has examined the effect that an armed conflict may have on decision making of Supreme Court 
justices.16  The presence of an armed conflict creates a situation in which a surplus of power is 
transferred to the president and, thus, decision making of the Court may recognize this.  Previous 
courts have articulated similar doctrines in Korematsu v. U.S. (1944) and Lichter v. U.S. (1948). 
 Epstein, Ho, King, and Segal (2005), however, disagree with this theoretical assertion.  
They find, using nonparametric matching, that during wartime, cases that are not directly related 
to the war will be decided in a more conservative manner than cases decided when no war is 
present.  However, contrary to most scholarly discourse on the subject, they conclude that the 
presence of war does not have a noticeable statistical effect on Supreme Court decision making 
                                                 
15 Besides the inclusion of a new variable into the model, Yates (2002) employed a logistic regression where Yates 
and Whitford (1998) uses a probit regression.  Yates (2002) also included dichotomous variables for each 
presidential administration in to control for interadministration deviations, “that may occur due to characteristics and 
phenomena attributable to specific presidents.”   
16 For example of such research see Lanier (2003), Chapter 6  
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in cases directly related to the war.  Epstein et al. (2005, 109) summarize: “we show that war 
causes the Court to decide cases unrelated to the war in a markedly more conservative direction 
than they otherwise would.  However, war appears to have no effect on the conservatism of the 
Court’s decisions in cases closely related to an ongoing military conflict.” 
 These results are questionable, however, because of the way in which “crisis” is defined.  
In operationalizing the term “crisis,” Epstein et al. formulate a three-part definition: the first two 
parts of the definition tap the traditional definition of crisis which are periods of actual war and 
events which “specialists have labeled as ‘major.’”17  Their third measure is, “the presence or 
absence of a ‘rally effect’ in the form of a ten-point (or greater) surge in presidential popularity 
caused by an international event” (46). Only one part of this three-pronged definition needs to be 
present for it to be labeled as a time of “crisis.”  These international events may, or may not, 
even be related to an actual interstate conflict.  Through the use of this three-part definition, their 
results may be inaccurate.  By including questionable operationalizations of “times of crisis,” 
they artificially inflate the number of cases that occurred during these time periods.  For my 
analysis, I employ a standardized definition of “armed conflict,” which arises from the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP).18  These data from the UCDP has been used in scholarly 
research since 1988, most recently by Harbom and Wallensteen (2005), and is updated annually.  
These data have also been backdated to 1946 (Gledistch et al. 2002).  This database has been 
tested numerous times for validity and reliability while the three-pronged definition of conflict 
used by Epstein et al. is being utilized essentially for the first time. 
                                                 
17 They include World War II, Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf Wars, and the war in Afghanistan.  They also include the 
Berlin Blockade, the Cuban Missile and Iran-Hostage crises, and September 11. 
18 “An ‘armed conflict’ is a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of 
armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-
related deaths” Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1995). 
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Summary 
 Interactions between the Supreme Court and the president are a complex, and under 
examined, occurrence.  Outside of the research of King and Meernik (1999), Yates and Whitford 
(1998) and Yates (2002) there has been little empirical work done examining the decision 
making process of the individual justices of the Supreme Court in cases involving presidential 
power.  While the attitudinal model (Segal and Spaeth 2002) continues to be the dominant 
paradigm in the field of judicial behavior, other researchers (e.g., Barnum 1985; Durr et al. 2000; 
Mishler and Sheehan 1993, 1996) have successfully  predicted decision-making of the Supreme 
Court using more sophisticated models which include extra-attitudinal and extra-legal factors. 
 Thus, to successfully examine the individual level decision-making of the Supreme Court 
in cases involving presidential power a naïve attitudinal model (Mishler and Sheehan 1996) will 
not suffice. As such, the next chapter will build the theoretical backing to help move beyond a 
simple attitudinal model, to a more robust and sophisticated model using numerous extra-
attitudinal and extra-legal factors which seek to more accurately describe the complex 
relationship between individual level justice voting in cases of presidential power. 
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CHAPTER TWO: ATTITUDINAL AND EXTRA-ATTITUDINAL 
FACTORS EFFECTING DECISION-MAKING 
 This thesis is not developed in isolation from other theory; its development is in response 
to the current dominant paradigm in judicial decision-making literature, the attitudinal model, as 
Segal and Spaeth (1993, 2002) developed.  The attitudinal model asserts that in all cases which 
appear before the Court, the individual justices need only to reference their personal ideologies 
(attitudes) relative to the issue stimulus of the case.  If their ideology is consistent with tenets of 
the case, the attitudinal model predicts that the justices will rule affirmatively in it.  If the 
justice’s ideology is not consistent with the facts of the case, that justice will vote against the 
case.  This model has its merits when it comes to its predictive capabilities of most cases.  
Furthermore, using ideology to predict vote choice is consistent with the bulk of literature of the 
field (e.g., Schubert 1965; 1974; Tate 1981; Tate and Handberg 1991).  However, this model 
does not include any variable other than the ideology of the justice, what Mishler and Sheehan 
(1996: 198) term the “naïve attitudinal model.” 
 While political scientists strive for parsimony when developing models of personal 
behavior, the attitudinal model may be faulted for its simplicity (Mishler and Sheehan 1996).  
The attitudinal model is in essence a one variable model, using ideology to predict a justice’s 
vote choice.  This one variable model does not take into account any extra-attitudinal factors.  
Segal and Spaeth (2002) argue that justices of the Supreme Court are isolated from external 
factors that would otherwise affect decision-making.  Segal and Spaeth note that Supreme Court 
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justices typically have no goals to seek further office19; appointment to the Court is the 
culmination of their employment and life goals.  Furthermore, since the Supreme Court is not 
subject to being over-ruled by other courts, the justices should be free to implement their policy 
goals through their office displaying their private notions on public issues (Schubert 1965).  
Also, Segal and Spaeth note that justices are nearly immune from political accountability, noting 
that only one justice in the history of the Court was impeached and that vote failed (Steamer 
1971).  Additionally they lack electoral accountability since they are nominated to their office, 
and have job security, because their positions are life-tenured.  To further show that justices are 
able to act solely on their policy goals, Segal and Spaeth note that the Supreme Court controls its 
own docket to a large extent.  They state that while this fact alone does not means justices are 
acting on their policy goals, it is a prerequisite to their doing so (Segal and Spaeth 2002). 
 While some of Segal and Spaeth’s assumptions about the Court are empirically 
supported; they fail to acknowledge the interconnection of the branches of the federal 
government.  Segal and Spaeth (2002) correctly assert that the decisions of the Court are not 
reversible by any other court; however, they simply attempt to explain away the check and 
balances that help to control the Courts decisions (Segal and Spaeth 2002).  The Congress can 
override the Court’s decision-making through statute as it did following Mansell v. Mansell 
(1989).  Since Congress controls the language of the law, it is certainly free to modify 
(Hausegger and Baum 1999).  Also, and of more impact to this study, the president also plays a 
role when it comes to judicial decision-making for it is his charge to enforce the decisions of the 
Supreme Court.  While it is rare, the president has refused to enforce the Court’s decision before 
                                                 
19 According to Epstein et al. (2002), only two justices (David Davis in 1877 and Charles E. Hughes in 1916) retired 
to seek elective office. 
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(e.g., Worcester v. Georgia 1831).  While this occurrence is certainly a rarity, the threat of its 
potentiality looms large.  A president’s refusing to enact a Court decision is tantamount to an 
executive fiat, and furthermore, it serves as an amazing rebuke to the institutional legitimacy of 
the Court. 
 Segal and Spaeth also correctly state that members of the Court are rarely impeached, but 
this fact alone does not mean that the justices or the Court are immune from political 
accountability (Mondak 1994).  Political accountability does not come in the form that justices 
are susceptible to being impeached, but rather from challenges to the Court’s institutional 
legitimacy.  Institutional legitimacy, in the form of public support, is necessary for justices to act 
on their policy goals.  As Justice Felix Frankfurter stated in Baker v. Carr (1962, 267), “the 
Court’s authority—possessed neither of the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained 
public confidence in its moral sanction.”  If the Court acts in a manner that draws negative 
attention upon the Court, it is more likely its decisional outputs will be questioned by other 
branches of the federal government, if not the public at large.  Such was the case during the 
Roosevelt Court-packing plan.  During the 1930s, much of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New 
Deal legislation was being overturned by the conservative Hughes Court.  These rulings were 
unpopular with both the presidential administration and the populace as a whole.  President 
Roosevelt, responding to the lack of institutional legitimacy, proposed a plan which would 
increase the size of the Supreme Court from nine members to fifteen (Pritchett 1958).  While this 
proposal served to be unpopular as well, two justices, Charles E. Hughes and Owen J. Roberts, 
began voting with the liberal bloc of the Court and made the issue moot (Pritchett 1958).  
Therefore, while political accountability may not come in the form of direct challenges to 
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individuals of the Court, it can come from broader, substantive challenge to the legitimacy of the 
Court. 
 In certain types of cases, mostly those of low saliency, the set of specifications which 
Segal and Spaeth set out may affect the Court in the way it describes.  Thus, in certain types of 
cases, the attitudinal model may be more valid.  Justices in lower saliency cases may act on the 
basis of their ideology alone.  However, in this subset of cases that deal with presidential power 
the attitudinal model is too simplistic to account for individual level decision-making because of 
the high saliency of these cases and the separation of power conflicts that are inherent in such 
cases.  Therefore I disagree with Segal and Spaeth (2002, 111) when they state, “justices need 
not respond to public opinion, Congress, or the President; and because the Supreme Court is the 
court of last resort the justices, unlike their lower court colleagues, may freely implement their 
personal policy preferences as the attitudinal model specifies.”  Cases which involve the 
president are highly salient encounters with extremely unique separation of powers conflicts.  
Despite the justices’ perceived “shielding” from outside influences, such cases as this study 
examines, which have the ability to call into question the institutional legitimacy of the Court, 
should be approached in a different manner than the naïve attitudinal model suggests. 
 This subset of cases references specific instances when the two branches of government 
come into direct contact and possible conflict with each other.  These cases are not typical; 
across the 56 years that the study examines, only 38 cases were found.  The rarity of these types 
of cases should serve as a signal to researchers that the Supreme Court is typically wary of 
hearing these cases.  Therefore, when these cases appear on its docket, one which they largely 
control, the Court may handle them with special care because these are fairly rare, extremely 
public, and nationally sensitive cases. 
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 If the predominant theory of Supreme Court decision-making, the attitudinal model, were 
applied to this subset of cases, despite the uniqueness of the political ramifications (which 
amount to direct judicial interaction with the executive branch), the balance of power issues that 
arise, and the distinct constitutional questions, it may be expected that justices would still simply 
vote their policy preferences because the attitudinal model assumes that all individual level 
decision-making by the Supreme Court justices is a function of ideology.  This theory is too 
simplistic to account for the complexities that arise in separation of power cases, in particular in 
cases that involve presidential power.  Therefore, while acknowledging the importance of a 
justice’s attitude in decision-making, this study postulates that there are multiple attitudinal and 
extra-attitudinal factors that may influence a justice’s individual level decision-making. 
 Following the research of Yates (2002) and others, this study theorizes that, Supreme 
Court cases in which the president or presidential power is being adjudicated, the attitudinal 
model of judicial decision-making may not completely account for the justices’ individual 
decision-making process because in these highly salient cases, the presence of external and 
political cues may influence the justices because highly salient cases such as these may call into 
question the very legitimacy of the Court.  Since there are numerous political and external factors 
that can affect the justices’ decision-making process in cases involving presidential power, there 
will be numerous hypotheses in order to test this theory. 
 Acknowledging that the Court’s decision-making in salient cases are directly affected by 
public opinion (Mishler and Sheehan 1993, 1996), and further realizing that if the Court rules 
contrary to public opinion, the diffuse public support of the institution may erode (Durr et al. 
2000), it is theoretically consistent that in cases involving the president, the justices of the Court 
may look to the president’s approval rating as a possible cue as to how to rule in a certain case.  
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Considering the myriad of topics on which the Court issues decisions, it would be nearly 
impossible to judge the publics’ opinion in all of them.  Furthermore, the public’s opinion is 
certainly not fixed on some abstract issues.  With regard to the president, however, public 
opinion is well formed and readily available for the justices to reference.  Ruling against a 
popular president may well create questions about the Court’s institutional legitimacy.  Thus, it 
would be more likely for a Court to be willing to rule against an unpopular president.  An 
unpopular president cannot effectively call upon public dissent of the Court’s decision because 
of the associated low political capital.  In essence, public approval of the president will serve to 
cue in part the justices as how they should vote. Therefore,  
H1. The president’s approval rating will be directly related to the likelihood that a justice 
will cast a vote supporting or extending presidential power. 
 While King and Meernik (1999) find that the president is not universally successful in 
cases that concern his foreign policy powers, it is a well-established finding that the president 
can act more authoritatively in foreign policy because of the greater power given to him pursuant 
to Article 2, Section 2 (Wildavsky 1966, 1989).  Wildavsky argued that the Constitution invested 
the president with a unique repository of power in the realm of foreign affairs.  From the 
president’s position as the head of state, he receives foreign diplomats, makes treaties, and 
represents the nation on an international scale.  Furthermore, as the commander-in-chief, the 
president is constitutionally the wager of war.  Wildavsky hypothesized that because of these 
specific constitutional dictates, a president could expect higher success rates in Congress with 
regard to foreign policy concerns.  While Wildavsky discussed presidential power via the 
Congress, the president may also enjoy increased deference before the Court.  Indeed, previous 
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research has found that the solicitor general (the lawyer for the Office of the President) 
experiences higher success rates before the Court than other litigators (McGuire 1998; Salokar 
1992).  The Court should recognize the constitutional advantages that the president enjoys when 
acting in accordance with his substantial foreign policy powers. Furthermore, in numerous 
decisions handed down by the Court (such as U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936) and 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952)), justices have consistently articulated that the 
president can act more decisively in the realm of foreign policy than within the domestic arena.  
Therefore, I expect that: 
H2. A justice will be more likely to vote to support the president’s position if the case 
involves foreign or military powers than a domestic power issue. 
 In the post-WWII era, Democrats began to question the extensive powers of the 
president.  The occurrences of the Vietnam War and Watergate only served to solidify their 
opinions (Thomas and Pika 1996).  The Democratic Party began to realize that with broad 
extensions of presidential power came the possibility of the abuses of that power.  Democrats in 
Congress sought to curtail the broad powers of the president.  As Fisher (1994, 741) stated, “the 
scope of presidential war powers climbed to such heights that the [Democratic] Congress felt 
compelled to pass the War Powers Resolution in 1973.”  The War Powers Resolution sought to 
limit the power of the president to wage armed conflict without a Congressional declaration of 
formal war.  Similarly, it would be theoretically consistent to expect that Democrats on the Court 
would behave similarly in voting to restrict the powers of the presidency.  Therefore, consistent 
with the results of Yates and Whitford (1998), 
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H3. A justice who is affiliated with the Democratic Party will be more likely to decide 
against the president in cases of presidential power. 
 Adherents of the theory of judicial replacement argue that the only time that a president 
can influence the decision making of the Court is through the nomination process (e.g., Dahl 
1957; Funston 1975; Norpoth and Segal 1994).  Tate (1981) and Tate and Handberg (1991) 
theorize another reason, besides patronage, that justices may be more deferential to their 
nominating president.  They assert that a president will nominate someone who shares similar 
goals and ideologies because they wish the legality of their policies to upheld in the Court.  
Therefore, despite whichever motivation is exerting its force, 
H4. A justice is more likely to rule for the president if that president nominated them to 
the bench. 
 Ducat and Dudley (1989) and Yates and Whitford (1998) argue that a justice who has 
previously served in an executive position may sympathize with the president, who occupies an 
office not so dissimilar from his/her previous employment.  They so theorize because there are 
certain restraints that come with the executive office and the uniform similarities of these 
restraints on executive offices may affect the justices’ votes.  Previous judicial experience has 
been found to serve as a strong predictive variable on individual level decision-making (Tate 
1981; Tate and Handberg 1991), and previous executive experience is hypothesized to have 
similar effects.  Therefore, 
H5. If a justice has had prior executive experience, then he or she will be more likely to 
decide in favor of the president. 
 Yates (2002) suggests that when a president appears before the Court, his status as a 
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litigant (petitioner or respondent) may influence how individual justices will vote in the case, 
citrus paribus.  Under most circumstances, the Court has discretion in deciding what cases to 
hear (e.g., Perry 1991) but in cases that are highly salient, such as those that involve presidential 
power, or that involve external pressures, such as concentrated public opinion and media 
coverage, make it more likely that the Court will grant certiorari.  In these situations, Yates 
hypothesizes that the Court will prefer situations in which it can rule simultaneously consistent 
with the ruling of the lower court and for the president.  Thus,  
H6.  A justice will be more likely to support presidential power if the president appears in 
front of the Court as a respondent.  
 The president traditionally experiences a “rally effect” when the United States in 
involved in an armed conflict (Baker and Oneal 2001; Lee 1997; Mueller 1973).  A “rally effect” 
is characterized by higher degrees of support for the president by the public and the Congress 
than otherwise observed.  During times of conflict, the president has more authority to act in both 
domestic and foreign powers (Baker and Oneal 2001).  The Court, therefore, may be influenced 
by a similar rally effect.  Some Supreme Court cases, such as Korematsu v. U.S. (1944), spell out 
specifically that during times of war, the president has a heightened degree of power.  Therefore,  
H7.  If the United States is involved in an armed conflict at the time of the Court’s 
decision, a justice will be more likely to rule in favor of the president. 
Uniqueness of The Analysis 
 This study’s contribution to this area of research is two-fold: first, the most recent 
research on the issue was concluded in 2002; that analysis covers the period from 1949 to 1993 
(Yates 2002).  Using nearly the same model as Yates and Whitford (1998), I will update the 
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analysis through the 2005 calendar year.  This will help analysts understand how the Court 
behaves when adjudicating cases involving presidential power, and how that behavior may have 
been modified since the issue was last examined.   
 Second, by inclusion of the armed conflict hypothesis (H7), I introduce a new concept to 
the study of president/Supreme Court relations.  If the presence of an armed conflict does 
influence how the Court decides, besides further showing the contextual limitations of the 
attitudinal model to accurately predict Supreme Court decision-making in cases involving the 
president, it will also provide further insight into interaction between these two branches of 
government since this is one of the two formal avenues in which these branches directly interact.  
Furthermore, it will extend the “rally effect” literature into an area in which it has rarely been 
used, the study of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Data Considerations 
 The data for this research will be drawn from numerous published sources.  To locate the 
Supreme Court cases that involve presidential power, I followed the same basic case collection 
procedures of Yates and Whitford (1998).  First, I obtained a list of all cases that involve Article 
I, Section 7, Article II, or Amendments XII, XX, XXII or XXV of the United States Constitution 
as listed in the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database (Spaeth 2002).  To include those 
cases that this process may have missed, I then searched the United States Supreme Court 
Digest-Lawyers’ Edition for the general topics of United States, War, and Constitutional law for 
cases which mentioned the president or the executive branch.  Cases were then screened by 
determining if presidential power was listed as the key point of law or discussed in the text of the 
case. Each case was then read and retained only if substantial discussion (defined as a paragraph 
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or more) was given to presidential power in the decision.  This selection of cases was then 
“shepardized” using Shepard’s Citations to determine if the progeny of the original cases dealt 
with presidential power as well.  This process yielded 38 cases. 
 The unit of analysis, however, will not be the case itself as this will result in too few 
cases.20  The dependent variable (N=337) is the individual votes of the justices in cases from 
1949 to 2005 where presidential power is being adjudicated, where 1 is coded as being a vote for 
presidential power and 0 is coded as a vote against presidential power.  I operationalize my 
dependent variable in this way in order to capture more variation, to increase my sample size, 
and to further provide a more micro-level, individual view of the decision-making process 
consistent with Mishler and Sheehan (1993, 1996), as they find that when using attributes and 
public opinion data to explain decision-making, median justices will be more affected by public 
opinion than others. 
 The first independent variable is presidential popularity.  The conceptual definition of 
presidential popularity will be the extent to which the American public approves of the job the 
president is doing.21  This variable will be operationally defined as the change (t2 – t1) in Gallup 
Public Opinion Polls over a three-month period preceding the decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in a given case. Yates and Whitford (1998) test presidential prestige in two ways: a simple 
average of all polls done in three month period and the change over time in those ratings.  They 
take the difference of the two polls as the measurement of presidential popularity.  Measured in 
this way, the variable should tap intra-administrational changes in popularity and produce a more 
representative picture of popularity trends than an average measure of popularity over three 
                                                 
20 Yates and Whitford found 32 cases decidedfrom 1949 to 1993. 
21 The question that will be utilized from the Gallup Poll asks, “Do you approve or disapprove of the way [name of 
the president] is handling his job as president?”. 
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months however, the less precise measure of popularity will be used in a separate model.  
Measured as the change over a three month period, These data hypothetically could range from       
– 100 to 100.  In actuality, the parameters of this variable range from – 12 (which occurred in 
three cases) to 25 (which occurred only in one case).  
 The second independent variable is case type.  Case type is conceptualized as whether the 
case being examined concerns the foreign policy powers of the president or domestic policy 
powers of the president.  This variable is operationalized by including cases that concern the 
military powers of the president with those that concern the foreign policy powers into one case 
type.  The reasoning underlying this variable’s operationalization is that the Constitution 
provides the president with specific enumerated powers in both the realms of foreign policy and 
military action, pursuant to Article II, Section 2.  Moreover, military action usually involves 
another state, which further taps a president’s foreign policy powers, so inclusion of the 
president’s military power with the foreign policy power is consistent theoretically.22  This 
variable as measured contains two values; coded 0 if the case involves foreign policy issues and 
coded 1 if the case deals with domestic policy concerns. 
 The third independent variable is justice ideology.  Justice ideology is conceptualized as 
the relative political liberalism of each member of the Court using the contemporary 
understanding of that term.23  The operational definition will be the placement of the justice on 
the Segal-Cover (1989) continuum.  The scores were developed as a result of completing a 
content analysis of newspaper editorials from the time that the president nominated the justice 
                                                 
22 Other researchers use a similar classification: Ducat and Dudley (1989), King and Meernik (1999), Peterson 
(1994), and Wildavsky (1966). 
23 This data will be drawn from The Supreme Court Compendium (Epstein et al. 2003). 
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until their conformation.  The scores range from 1, being associated with the most liberal, to 0, 
being the most conservative.  These ideology scores provide direction (they range from 0 to 1, 
are not constrained as either 0 or 1) and an interval level of measurement.24   Tate (1981) 
demonstrates that personal attribute models, including party identification measures, have 
significant predictive powers when analyzing individual justice votes in economic and civil 
liberties/rights cases.  Tate and Handberg (1991) further show that personal attribute models, 
including party identification measures, have predictive success over substantial time periods 
(1916 – 1988).  Ducat and Dudley used the less precise measure of simple party identification, 
but their results were less impressive than those of Yates and Whitford, who employed the more 
precise measurement.  This study will also include measures of personal attributes such as party 
identification and rural/urban origins, following Tate (1981) and Tate and Handberg (1991).  An 
alternative model will be estimated without the Segal-Cover scores, but including party 
identification and rural/urban origins.  Party identifications will be coded so that 0 is Republican, 
1 is Independent (Frankfurter for this analysis), and 2 is Democrat.  The rural or urban origins 
variable will be coded 0 if the justice is from rural origins, and 1 if the justice was raised in an 
urban environment.  These less precise measures of personal attributes are expected to have a 
similar effect on the model as do the Segal-Cover scores, but to a lesser extent because of their 
lack of specificity. 
 The fourth independent variable included in the present analysis is the nominating 
president.  This variable is conceptualized and operationalized as the president who nominated 
each justice.  Some cases arise that concern a president who has already left office.  These cases 
                                                 
24 Furthermore not all justices are easily assigned to political parties (namely, Frankfurter and Brandeis) so the use 
of the Segal-Cover scores should more accurately predict their behavior 
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will be assigned to the president who the case involves, not the incumbent.  Previous researchers 
have hypothesized that if a justice is nominated by the president, who is party to the case being 
adjudicated, then the justice will be more likely to vote for the president.  Ducat and Dudley 
(1989) find this coefficient estimate to produce a statistically significant effect on their model, 
while Yates and Whitford (1998) and Yates (2002) do not.  Yates (2002) reasons that this result 
is because Ducat and Dudley were researching Federal Court judges, who, while they have life 
tenure, still are dependent upon the president for a possible promotion to the Supreme Court or 
other position.  Yates recognizes that the Supreme Court justices lack this influence by the 
nominating president.  The variable will be included in the model to retain comparability with 
the previous research and to test if the relationship has gained in statistical significance since 
previous research was conducted.  It will be coded as a dummy variable for which 0 is a justice 
not nominated by the president involved with the case, and 1 is a just who was nominated by the 
president which the case involves. 
 The fifth independent variable is executive experience.  This variable is conceptualized 
and operationalized by the presence of any form of governmental executive experience in the 
justice’s historical career at the state or federal level.  It is hypothesized that justices with prior 
executive experience will be more deferential to the president because the justices may 
sympathize with the limitations of an executive office (Tate 1981; Tate and Handberg 1991).  
Both Ducat and Dudley (1989) and Yates and Whitford (1998) find that prior executive 
experience has no statistically significant associated with on the dependent variable; however, it 
will be retained to further continuity of this research with the existing literature.  This variable 
will also be coded as a dummy variable such that a justice coded 0 had no prior executive 
experience and a justice coded 1 had prior executive experience at the federal or state level. 
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 The sixth independent variable is petitioner status.  This variable is conceptualized and 
operationalized as the litigant status which the president appears before the Court, whether it is 
as petitioner or respondent.  Yates (2002) hypothesized that if the president appears in front of 
the Court as respondent, the justices will be more likely to rule in favor of the president because 
the president has already won in a lower court.  Typically, the Court possesses a good deal of 
discretion when granting certiorari and chooses cases which it is likely to reverse (Provine 1980; 
Perry 1991).  For example, according to Epstein et al. (2003), in 2001, 9,195 cases were 
petitioned the Court for review, however, only 88 of those cases were granted certiorari.  
However, in high profile cases such as those which involve presidential power, the Court does 
not possess the same amount of discretion because these are abnormally public controversies in 
which the Court could lose some legitimacy if it denied certiorari.  Cases involving the president 
fall into this category.  As Yates (2002, 34) notes, “when the president appears as a respondent, 
he has, in effect, been hauled before the Supreme Court by a litigant that the federal court chose 
not to support.  Here, the Court can both support the president and decide consistently with the 
lower federal court.”  This variable will be coded as 0 if the president is appearing before the 
court as a petitioner and 1 if the president appears as the respondent. 
 The seventh independent variable is the presence of an armed conflict.  This variable is 
conceptualized as the presence of an armed conflict in which the United States is involved in on 
the date on which the Supreme Court announces its decision in the case being analyzed.  This 
research will use the definition of armed conflict as identified in Wallensteen and Sollenberg 
(1995, 345): armed conflict is, “a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”  The presence of armed 
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conflict will be operationalized as armed conflicts involving the United States and another 
political actor.  This data will come from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.25  I will 
alternatively, in a separate model, specify armed conflict by the Correlates of War (COW) 
definition to determine if magnitude of the event, in the form of body count, has a noticeable 
effect upon the decision-making of the Court.  The COW database classifies armed conflict in a 
similar way as the UCDP, but only includes an event in the database if it has had at least 1000 
battle-related deaths in a year.  The COW data has been used substantially since Singer and 
Small (1972) and is the dominant dataset in the study of international conflict.  Measures for 
both armed conflict variables will be coded as dummies, with 0 being the absence of armed 
conflict and 1 being the presence of it. 
 To analyze this data, I will employ a logistic regression because my dependent variable is 
















 b1 = presidential approval rating 
 b2 = case type 
 b3 = justice party affiliation 
 b4 = nominating president 
                                                 
25 For examples of other research using the UCDP see Gleditsch et al. (2002) and Wallensteen and Sollenberg 
(1995). 
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 b5 = prior executive experience 
 b6 = litigant status of the president 
 b7 = presence of armed conflict 
 Since my dependent variable is dichotomous (a vote either for or against the president), 
using OLS regression would violate one of the assumptions of linear regression, that being the 
linearity of the dependent variable (Cleary and Angel 1984; Lottes et al. 1996; Walsh 1987).  
Since the dependent variable can only obtain two values, a logistic regression accounts for this, 
by assuming an s-curve instead of a linear form.  Yates and Whitford (1998) initially used probit 
analysis following the research of Ducat and Dudley (1989); however, when Yates (2002) 
modified the model, he employed logistic regression which provided a better fit for the 
dependent variable.  Since this study will be extending that research of Yates, it will use the 
same methodology in order to maintain continuity and comparability to that study. 
Summary 
 Thus, this study will examine the effect of attitudinal and extra-attitudinal factors on the 
individual level decision-making of the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in cases involving 
presidential power.  By using both attitudinal and extra-attitudinal factors, this study will attempt 
to show the limitations of a simple attitudinal model in complex and highly salient cases such as 
those which involve presidential power. 
 Before examining the formal model’s performance the data needs to be formally 
examined to describe the data and to detect for any possible statistical errors.  In order to do this 
descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations will be used.  These methods of analysis will 
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provide a better understanding of These data being used and allow the researcher to detect if 
there are any abnormalities associated with the data collection process. 
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CHAPTER THREE: EXPLORATORY ANALYSES OF THE DATASET 
 The time period to be analyzed in this study spans 56 calendar years, from the beginning 
of the Vinson Court (1949) to the end of the Rehnquist Court (2005).  During this period, 30 
different Supreme Court Justices served; the first, Hugo Black, was sworn in on August 19, 
1937: the last, Stephen Breyer, on August 3, 1994.  Across this period, four different chief 
justices served: Frederick Moore Vinson (1946–1953), Earl Warren (1953–1974), Warren Earl 
Burger (1969–1995), and William Hubbs Rehnquist (1986–2005).  During this time, eleven 
presidents also served, beginning with Harry S Truman and continuing through George W. Bush.  
This period of analysis begins shortly after the end of World War II, including the Korean War, 
the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, the War in Iraq, and the entire Cold War.  It also 
includes minor skirmishes that the United States was involved in, including the Taiwan Strait 
Crisis in 1954 and 1958, the nationalist uprising in Puerto Rico in 1950, the Bay of Pigs invasion 
in 1961, numerous conflicts in Southeast Asia during the 1960s, the American Invasion of 
Grenada in 1983, the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, and the assault on Afghanistan and Iraq 
beginning in 2001. 
 In short, the time period being examined is complex historically and politically.  In the 56 
years that this study covers, numerous events have occurred that could serve to influence 
decision-making of the Court.  If external factors may influence how the members on the Court 
behave, it is important to include them in any analysis of decision-making but especially in cases 
that involve presidential power.  Decisions in many Supreme Court cases have little impact 
outside of the issue area that the particular case involves.  That is to say, the precedent of most 
cases, while law and binding upon the nation, has limited influence outside of the topical area of 
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the case.  Rulings in tax law affect only tax law while, rulings in civil procedure affect only civil 
procedure.  This is certainly not the case with presidential power.  A ruling for or against the 
president can have “fallout” effects for other institutions and branches of government.  For 
example, in INS v. Chadha (1983), the Court held that a legislative veto was unconstitutional.  A 
legislative veto refers to the congressional negation of federal agency or presidential actions.  
While the direct ruling in the case meant that the House of Representatives was not allowed to 
overrule Immigration and Naturalization Services and deport Chadha, the fallout of the decision 
was much broader.  Following this decision, executive agencies were free from Congressional 
oversight in the form of a legislative veto.  Considering executive agencies range from the 
Federal Communications Committee, which regulates the broadcast airwaves, to the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, which is a law enforcement agency, the fallout effect was 
widespread.  Thus, it would seem anti-theoretical that the esteemed members of the highest 
Court would approach a tax law cases with the same decision-making strategy as a case 
involving presidential power.  Therefore, external factors should be considered in order to 
develop the most theoretically developed and predictive model of the justices’ behavior in this 
subset of cases. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 As stated previously, there are 337 individual votes to be analyzed this analyses dataset.  
On the whole, 201 votes were cast in favor of presidential power, representing 59.6 percent of 
the sample.  Presidents have faired well before the Court throughout time, with the notable 
exceptions of President Nixon and President Ford.  President Nixon won only 10 votes out of the  
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 52 the total votes cast involving his administration, while President Ford won only seven votes 
out of 17 total.  President George W. Bush has, through 2005, won a little less than half has well, 
but with more years remaining in his presidency, this is a trend that could be merely temporary.   
Table 1 shows the proportion of pro-presidential power votes by total votes.  There is a 
significant discrepancy between the cases reported by Yates and Whitford (1998) and myself.  
For some presidents, I found more cases than they did; for others, I found fewer.  Since similar 
coding rules were used, this result seems curious.  While Yates and Whitford do not report their 
case list, mine are included in the appendix for replicablity and review by future researchers. 
Table 1 Presidential Success Before the Supreme Court: Truman through George W. Bush 
President % Votes of Total 
Votes 
President % Votes of Total 
Votes 
Truman 
(1949 – 53) 
50% for 18 Votes 
[60 % for 25 Votes] 
Carter 
(1977 – 81) 
88.8% for 9 Votes 
[38.9% for 18 Votes] 
Eisenhower 
(1953 – 61) 
50% for 18 Votes 
[16.7% for 8 Votes] 
Reagan 
(1981 – 89) 
70.9% for 62 Votes 
[61.4% for 70 Votes] 
Johnson 
(1963 – 69) 
76.4% for 17 Votes 
[66.7% for 9 Votes] 
Bush Sr. 
(1989 – 93) 
91.6% for 36 Votes 
[64.2% for 53 Votes] 
Nixon 
(1969 – 74) 
21.1% for 52 Votes 
[32.6% for 43 Votes] 
Clinton 
(1993 – 01) 
69.1 for 81 Votes 
[100% for 9 Votes]* 
Ford 
(1974 – 77) 
41.1% for 17 Votes 
[65.7 for 35 Votes] 
Bush  
(2001 – 05) 
40.7% for 27 Votes 
Percents in brackets are those that Yates and Whitford results for each corresponding president. 
*Yates and Whitford’s analysis ends in 1993 
 
 The case type variable (whether the case is foreign/domestic), is relatively evenly 
distributed throughout the sample as well.  Throughout the time period of the sample, the Court 
heard 16 cases dealing with foreign policy concerns of the president and 22 cases dealing with 
domestic policy.  This yields 144 foreign policy votes and 198 domestic policy votes.  This 
finding is consistent with one of King and Meernik (1999), who find that the Court consistently  
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hears cases each year dealing with foreign policy.  This finding counters the conclusion in 
Henkin (1996, 148), who states, “the Supreme Court in particular intervenes only infrequently 
and its foreign affairs cases are few and haphazard.” 
 Other variables, however, are not as evenly distributed throughout the sample, nor were 
they expected to be.  Examining the simple frequency of the nominating president variable, it 
shows that around 20 percent of the votes cast were by a justice who was nominated by the 
president who was involved in the case.  While this number is not large (N=69), it is large 
enough for our sample to produce valid effects.  The prior executive experience variable is of 
nearly the same size (N=66) and is large enough to affect the sample potentially. 
 Turning to the personal attribute variables, the distribution is fairly uniform, although it 
shifts over time.  In the beginning of the time period, there was a more uniform distribution 
between justices who had rural and urban origins; however, following Justice Goldberg’s 
nomination in 1962 by President Kennedy, nearly all justices were uniformly drawn from urban 
backgrounds. 
 Looking at the distribution of party identification among the justices, the sample contains 
15 Democrats, 1 Independent (Frankfurter, who is nominally considered a Democrat), and 14 
Republicans.  The distribution, however, is not consistent throughout time, with there being more 
Democrats in the earlier segment of the sample (1949–1976), with more Republicans in the latter 
years.  This is theoretically consistent with the number of Justices nominated by Republican 
presidents in later half of the sample.  The Segal-Cover scores range from as low as a total 
conservative score of 0 (Justice Scalia) to a total liberal score of 1 (Justices Jackson, Brennan, 
Fortas, and Thurgood Marshall). 
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Table 2 Personal Attributes of the Supreme Court Justices 
Justice Party ID   Rural/    Segal/ Justice Party ID Rural/     Segal/ 
  Urban Cover  Urban     Cover 
Vinson Dem Rural 0.75 Goldberg Dem Urban 0.75 
Black Dem Rural 0.875 Fortas Dem Urban 1  
Reed Dem Rural 0.725 Marshall Dem Urban 1 
Frankfurter Ind Urban 0.665 Burger Rep Urban 0.115  
Douglas Dem Rural 0.73 Blackmun Rep Urban 0.115 
Jackson Dem Rural 1 Powell Dem Urban 0.165  
Burton Rep Urban 0.28 Rehnquist Rep Urban 0.045 
Clark Dem Urban 0.5 Stevens Rep Urban 0.25 
Minton Dem Rural 0.72 O’Connor Rep Urban 0.415 
Warren Rep Rural 0.75 Scalia Rep Urban 0 
Harlan Rep Urban 0.875 Kennedy Rep Urban 0.365 
Brennan Dem Urban 1 Souter Rep Rural 0.325 
Whittaker Rep Rural 0.5 Thomas Rep Rural 0.25 
Stewart Rep Urban 0.75 Ginsburg Dem Urban 0.68 
White Dem Rural 0.5 Breyer Dem Urban 0.475   
 
 The variables that measure attributes of the president are litigant status and the 
president’s approval.  The litigant status variable is distributed evenly throughout the sample. It 
mirrors the distribution of case type more closely than any other, with 144 votes occurring during 
cases where the president was petitioner and 198 votes occurring when the president was 
respondent.  Public opinion, however, is not as evenly distributed.  The public approval variable 
measures the change in approval ratings of the president for a three-month period preceding the 
decision in the case.  Therefore, hypothetically, this measure can range anywhere from -100 to 
100.  For the 38 cases of the sample, opinion change ranged from -12 to 25.  Instead of the 
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hypothetical range of 200 points, the data’s range is much smaller, consisting of only 37 absolute 
points.  While the mean of the data is -1.39, the mode is 1 occurring for 5 cases (13.2% of the 
sample), with -1 being the next frequently occurring score in 4 cases (10.5% of the sample).  
Three cases occurred under conditions of a 12-point drop in the approval rating of the president: 
Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Noise Abatement (1991) under Bush Sr., Freytag v. Commissioner 
(1991) also under Bush Sr., and Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council (1993) under Clinton.  Both 1991 
cases were handed down on the same day, explaining why they share the same score.  Only one 
case occurred following a 25-point increase: Goldwater v. Carter (1979).  However, there may 
be other factors influencing this precipitous decrease in presidential approval level. 
 Armed conflict was measured in two ways in order to test whether magnitude of the 
armed conflict in terms of body count has a discernable effect on individual-level voting.  Using 
the more inclusive measure of armed conflict in terms of body count (the one developed by the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program), 18 cases in the sample occurred during times of armed conflict.  
The armed conflicts included in this measure are the Korean War (1948-1950), the Taiwan Strait 
Conflicts (1954, 1958), the Puerto Rican Nationalist Uprising (1950), the Bay of Pigs Invasion 
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Figure 3 Partisan Identification Over Time 
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Figure 4 Litigant Status of the President Over Time 
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(1961), the conflict in South Vietnam (1962-1964), the conflict in Laos (1963-1973), the 
Vietnam War (1965-1975), Cambodia (1970-1973), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), Operation 
Desert Storm (1991), U.S. invasion of Afghanistan (2001-2005), and the Iraq War (2003-2005).  
Armed conflict measured in the more restrictive manner in terms of body count (following the 
Correlates of War definition), occurred in 12 of 38 cases.  This measure did not include the 
Taiwan Strait Conflicts, the Vietnam War (1974, 1975), or the U.S. involvement in Grenada and 
Panama. 
Bivariate Analyses 
 Before discussing the more statistically complex logistic regression, These data will be 
explained through simple bivariate analyses to determine the actual direction and strength of the 
relationships.  In this section, crosstabulations will be estimated with and without controls for 
case type to determine if case type may influence the direction or magnitude of the relationships 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable. 
 The first bivariate analysis is the sort of individual level votes by case type.  It has been 
argued by numerous authors (e.g., Wildavsky 1966, 1969; King and Meernik 1999; Yates and 
Whitford 1998; Yates 2002) that the president will achieve more success when acting under 
foreign policy powers than domestic powers.   Therefore, in the crosstabulation, it is expected to 
find a significant relationship between case type and individual level votes, and that a vote which 





Table 3 Crosstabulation of Votes by Case Type 





































Chi-Square = 19.604, p<0.01 
Cramer’s V = .241 
Percents are column based 
 
 Table 3 shows that case type clearly is correlated with individual justice voting.  This 
table shows that in cases dealing with the foreign policy powers of the president, a justice is 
more likely to cast a vote in favor of presidential power, while in domestic cases the opposite 
holds true.  The Cramer’s V test statistic of .241 shows this is a moderately strong relationship.  
Cramer’s V, the proper measure of association between two nominal variables, is measured on a 
metric from 0 (no relationship) to 1 (a perfect relationship) (Kennedy 2003).  The Chi-Square 
measure examines the distribution of the variables against the null hypothesis that assumes an 
equal distribution.  The critical value for this table is .4772, so the Chi-Square measure of 19.604 
substantially crosses the critical value, meaning that the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
 Yates (2002) argues that litigant status of the president is directly associated with how a 
justice will vote in the case.  Yates hypothesizes, as do I, that if the president appears before the 
Court as a respondent, individual justices will be more likely to vote in his favor because they 




Table 4 Crosstabulation of Votes by Litigant Status of the President 
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Chi-Square = .269, p=.604 
Cramer’s V = .028  
 
 The findings of this crosstabulation fails to reject the null hypothesis (which states there 
is no relationship between litigant status and the way a justice votes).  This crosstabulation was 
also estimated while controlling for case type, but the results did not reach conventional levels of 
statistical significance.  Indeed, it appears that as the petitioner, the president will experience 
similar levels of success as when he is a respondent.  This association may still reach statistical 
significance when controlling for other factors, which will be done in formal regression model.  
This crosstabulation, however, does not lend support to the litigant status hypothesis. 
 Yates and Whitford (1998) also hypothesize that if the president has nominated a justice 
who is ruling on a case concerning him, that justice will be more likely to rule in his favor.  
Ducat and Dudley (1989) find this to be a statistical significant explanatory variable, when 
explaining decision-making of the Courts of Appeal, however Yates and Whitford (1998) and 






Table 5 Crosstabulation of Votes by Presidential Nominee 




Votes            Negative Power 
 
 

























Chi-Square = .110, p=.740 
Cramer’s V = .018  
 
 As expected, there is no relationship when between the presidential nominee variable and 
the individual justice’s votes.  There was also no relationship demonstrated between the variables 
when controlling for case type.  Ducat and Dudley find this association to be a statistically 
significant predictor of vote choice for Courts of Appeals judges.  However, the Courts of 
Appeals are dissimilar from the Supreme Court in that they are not  courts of last resort.  The 
judges on the Courts of Appeals are dependent on the president for possible promotion to the 
Supreme Court or an executive position within his cabinet.  Furthermore, members of the Courts 
of Appeals could have electoral motivations as well.  These motivations are not present for 
justices of the Supreme Court; hence it is theoretically consistent that the nominating president 
association would not reach statistical significance. 
 Tate and Handberg (1991) argue that personal attribute models have significant 
predictive power when it comes to individual level decision-making models of the Court because 
personal attributes serve as proxy measures for individual ideological attitudes.  Similarly, it 
should hold true that personal attributes may have a significant affect on decision-making in 
cases of presidential powers like Tate (1981) and Tate and Handberg (1991).  One personal 
attribute included in the current model being examined is rural/urban origins.  I hypothesize that 
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a justice’s urban background will be directly related to a vote for presidential power.  When this 
analysis is estimated without controlling for case type, there is no relationship demonstrated; 
however, when controlling for case type, the crosstabulation for domestic cases approaches 
significance at the p<.100 level.  When controlling for other factors, this variable may exert a 
statistically significant affect on the model. 





Votes            Negative Power 
 
 

























Chi-Square = .024, p=.876 
Cramer’s V = .013  
 
 When selecting only foreign policy cases, rural/urban origins is not a significant predictor 
of individual level votes.  A possible explanation for this finding is that case type may dominate 
the relationship.  Thus, when a justice is casting a vote in foreign policy cases, the justice 
considers case type more heavily than their personal attributes, as measured by rural/urban 
origins.  However, in the aggregate, justices who were socialized in rural areas appear to support 
the president at a higher rate in foreign policy cases than did such justices in domestic cases.  










Votes            Negative Power 
 
 

























Chi-Square = 2.188, p=.139 
Cramer’s V = .106  
 
 This crosstabulation as well does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance 
and, thus, fails to reject the null hypothesis.  However, the relationship may be demonstrated 
when controlling for other variables in the formal model. 
 The relationship for party identification is ultimately a much better predictor of decision 
making in this sub-set of Supreme Court cases than is rural/urban origins.  This is not surprising 
when considering that while rural/urban origins may affect the justice’s view point, party 
identification amounts to a self-assignment of themselves into a group that represents their 
attitudes.  A justice’s origin is something they are assigned based on where they grow up, a 
factor ultimately out of their control.  While it can be argued that party identification is out of 
their control as well, that it in fact is generated as part of a nurturing process of childhood (Sears 
and Funk 1999) ultimately however, party identification is a self-chosen assignment.  Since the 
justices choose to identify themselves as Republican, independent, or Democrat, this label may 
be an excellent predictor of individual level decision-making.  Indeed, prior research (Segal and 
Spaeth 1993, 2002; Tate 1981; Tate and Handberg 1991), has shown that party identification 
accurately predicts individual-level voting on the Court. 
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 Yates and Whitford (1998) hypothesize, as I do, that a justice’s affiliation with the 
Republican Party will be positively correlated with a vote in favor of presidential power.  This is 
because following World War II, Democrats began to fear the extensive powers of the executive, 
and these fears were only magnified with the occurrence of the Vietnam War and Watergate 
(Thomas and Pika 1996).  In the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, the Congress passed many 
statutes designed to curb what they believed to be overreaching by the president.  Termed the 
“Imperial Presidency,” the president has been viewed as growing overly powerful in the last 30 
years (Schlesinger 2004).  These concerns have grown even louder with the current Bush 
administration’s War on Terrorism. 
Table 8 Crosstabulation of Votes by Partisan Identification 
Party Identification  
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Chi-Square = 16.832, p< .001 
Cramer’s V = .223 
 
 Table 8 shows that the hypothesized relationship between party identification and a 
justice’s votes may be empirically supported.  This relationship is nearly as strong as that 
between case type and vote choice in that they both have similar magnitudes of Cramer’s V 
measures with equivalent levels of statistical significance.  Republican justices appear to be more 
likely to vote for extensions of presidential power than do Democratic justices.  The relationship 
was estimated controlling for case type and a similar relationship was found, implying that case 
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type does not intervene upon partisan identification in individual-level vote choice.  This finding 
is important because it shows that case type and partisan identification are independent of each 
other and do not covariate.  Both partisan identification and case type could have statistically 
significant effects upon individual level decision-making when controlling for the other because 
the two variables measure distinctly different occurrences which are not theoretically linked. 
Table 9 Crosstabulation of Votes by Partisan Identification controlling for Domestic Cases 
Party Identification  
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Chi-Square = 10.803, p<.005 
Cramer’s V = .236 
 
 The Cramer’s V measurement in Table 9 and Table 10 are nearly identical, which implies 
that the relationship between partisan identification and the justices’ votes retain the same 
relative strength even when controlling for case type.  The justice’s partisan identification has the 
same affect in domestic cases as foreign. 
When comparing the distribution between the two crosstabulations, it is important to note 
that Republican justices show an increased likelihood to support the president in foreign policy 
cases (59 percent to 82.1 percent).  Also, Democratic justices experience a similar change; 




Table 10 Crosstabulation of Votes by Partisan Identification controlling for Foreign Cases 
Party Identification  
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Chi-Square = 8.056, p < .018 
Cramer’s V = .237 
 
 The last remaining personal attribute to be examined is the Segal-Cover scores, which 
measures ideology of the justices, a metric created from a textual analysis of newspaper 
editorials written about the individual justices from the time they were nominated until their 
confirmation.  This measure was developed to be used to examine the effect of personal 
attributes on civil rights and liberties cases, but other researchers have found it to have predictive 
possibilities in other sub-sets of Supreme Court cases (Arrington and Brenner 2004; Segal et al. 
1995; Yates and Whitford 1998; Yates 2002, but see Epstein and Mershon 1996).  Segal-Cover 
scores range from 0 (being the most conservative) to 1 (being the most liberal).  Yates and 
Whitford (1998) hypothesize that a justice with a lower Segal-Cover score will be more likely to 
vote in favor of presidential power than a justice with a higher score.  The crosstabulation of 
votes by Segal-Cover scores is not practical to display because the empirical scores are an 
interval level variable containing too many values to be easily fitted on the printed page.  
However, the relationship is significant at the p<.019 level.  The Chi-Square value is 36.529, 
which is quite large, especially when considering the critical value for this relationship is .4772.  
The η (designed to measure nominal by interval level relationships) is .320 (on a 0 to 1 metric), 
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implying there is a strong relationship between these two variables.  In the regression analysis, 
models will be estimated twice: once using party identification and rural/urban origins as the 
measures of personal attributes; the other using the Segal-Cover scores.  The reason for 
completing two separate models is because there is a high degree of multicollinearity between 
party identification and the Segal-Cover scores (η = .962). 
 Yates and Whitford (1998) and Yates (2002) find public approval of the president at the 
time a decision is handed down to be a statistically significant predictor of how an individual 
justice will vote in a case involving presidential power.  Public approval was measured by Yates 
and Whitford (1998) and in this study as the change in the public approval rating of the president 
over a three-month period preceding the decision of the case.  The crosstabulation of votes by 
approval rating generates a significant relationship at the p<.001 level.  The Chi-Square measure 
of 89.168 shows a substantial relationship (ℓ=.000).  The η measurement shows a strong 
relationship at .514.  However, when controlling for case type, the relationship between public 
opinion and vote choice becomes muted in foreign policy cases.  Comparing the Chi-Square 
statistics, the relationship between votes and opinion in only domestic cases is more than double 
that of the same relationship in only foreign cases (79.369 for domestic and 37.628 for foreign).  
Both relationships, however, retain their statistical significance where ℓ = .000 (domestic) and ℓ 
= .000 (foreign).  Thus, while public opinion has a statistically significant affect concerning both 
types of cases (foreign and domestic), the relationship appears to be substantially strong in the 
domestic cohort. 
 There, however, appears to be an occurrence of multicollinearity between the public 
opinion variable and the armed conflict variable.  Multicollinearity occurs when two independent 
variables are correlated with each other to a large degree (Gujarati 2002).  This is a statistical 
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problem because one of the assumptions in a regression equation is that effects of the exploratory 
variables are independent of each other.  The multicollinearity experienced between armed 
conflict and public opinion would be consistent with the “rally” literature, which argues that 
armed conflict leads to an increase in public opinion for the president (Baker and Oneal 2001; 
Lee 1977; Mueller 1973).  Similarly, when estimating a crosstabulation between these two 
variables, there is a statistically significant relationship (ℓ = .000).  The Chi-Square for this 
relationship is substantial at 186.770.  Furthermore, the η for the relationship was .739, showing 
a substantially strong relationship.  This η measure shows a strong possibility of multicollinearity 
between public opinion and armed conflict.  It is possible that the inclusion of the armed conflict 
variable in the regression may mute the influence of public opinion on the dependent variable. 
 The relationship between armed conflict and individual-level voting in cases of 
presidential power has not been explored in the previous literature.  The hypothesis of this paper 
asserts that there will be a direct relationship between the presence of armed conflict and the 
likelihood of a justice supporting presidential power. 
Table 11 Crosstabulation of Votes by Armed Conflict in all Cases 
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Chi-Square = .727, p= .394 
Cramer’s V = .046 
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 There appears to be no relationship between armed conflicts (as measured by the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program) without controlling for case type.  If there is a relationship between 
individual voting and armed conflict in only one of the case types, it would mean that armed 
conflict only effects decision-making in that case type; however, if it has a significant effect on 
both case types it would mean that the relationship has different directional effects depending 
upon case type. 
Table 12 Crosstabulation of Votes by Armed Conflict in only Domestic Cases 
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Chi-Square = 8.248, p<.004 
Cramer’s V = .206 
 
Table 13 Crosstabulation of Votes by Armed Conflict in only Foreign Cases 
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Chi-Square = 22.892, p<.000 
Cramer’s V = .400 
 
 The results shown in Table 12 and Table 13 imply that armed conflict has different 
directional effects on individual level voting when controlling for case type.  Furthermore, the 
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relationship appears significantly stronger for foreign cases than those that are domestic.  There 
are two implications of this finding.  First, armed conflict does exhibit a statistically significant 
effect on individual level decision-making of U.S Supreme Court justices. Second, the effect of 
armed conflict is directional meaning that, during armed conflict, a president is more likely to 
win if the case involves his domestic powers, and more likely to lose if the case involves his 
foreign policy powers.  This finding is consistent with those of Epstein et al. (2005). 
Summary 
 While descriptive statistics and bivariate analyses partially describe the relationships 
between the variables, it is impossible to fully explain the complexities of individual-level justice 
voting in cases of presidential power without using a more rigorous form of analysis.  In order to 
analyze the effect of these numerous variables on individual-level voting, in the next chapter I 
will use logistic regression in order to examine the influence of the variables while holding the 
values of the other explanatory variables constant.  Then, one can more clearly understand the 
association of various influences on the decision-making of individual justices in cases involving 
the president. 
 In chapter three steps have been taken to provide a better understanding of the dataset 
being used in the present analysis.  Trends were described not only over time, but with relation to 
each other.  Case type appears to be the strongest predictor of individual-level justice voting.  
Case type also appears to modify the relationship between the other explanatory variables and 
justice voting.  This may mean that the model which this study proposes could contain different 
effects depending on cases type.  In order to access the possibility of this occurrence, the next 
chapter will examine the model not only in the aggregate (including both cases types), but also 
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by estimating separate models for each case type.  It is hypothesized that explanatory variables 
within the domestic case model will exhibit a stronger effect upon individual level voting, 
partially because of the statistical dominance of foreign policy cases in individual level decision-
making. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS OF THE FORMAL, INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL 
DECISION-MAKING MODEL 
 While the previous chapter examined the dataset in detail, simple descriptive statistics 
and bivariate analysis cannot accurately test the formal model correctly.  While these basic 
analyses can serve to describe These data and display some methodologically basic correlations 
between variables, they do not have the statistical rigor needed to asses the effects of multiple 
independent variables on a dependent variable.  Traditionally, in order to determine the effect of 
numerous independent variables on a dependent variable, an ordinary least squares regression is 
used (Stimson 1985).  However, one of the assumptions of OLS regressions is that the dependent 
variable is continuous and linear.  The dependent variable for this analysis (the vote of the 
individual justice in each case) is dichotomous.  Dichotomous variables do not tend to follow a 
linear trend; instead, the trend of dichotomous variables tends to follow an s-shaped curved.  
Thus, for dichotomous variables, a logistic regression is traditionally employed because, by 
utilizing the log values of the independent variables, the regression can determine the 
coefficients effect on the curvilinear dependent variable (Cleary and Angel 1984; Lottes et al. 
1996; Walsh 1987). 
 However, before calculating the logistic regression, certain tests need to be completed in 
order to check for problems within the dataset.  The problems this data set was tested for were 
multicollinearity and autocorrelation.  If the presence of either of issues is found, the findings 
could be misleading, muted, or simply incorrect (Gujarati 2002).  Once these issues are tested 
for, and, if found corrected, then it is appropriate to test the formal individual level decision-
making model through a logistic regression. 
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Autocorrelation 
 All regression equations are predicated on the statistical assumption that the disturbance 
term from one observation is not correlated with the disturbance term of the previous 
observation.  When working with time-series data, such as the type collected for this analysis, 
these disturbance terms may be correlated.  This is called autocorrelation or serial correlation.  
The presence of autocorrelation in a regression can cause an error in the coefficients estimates of 
statistical significance, thus it is an important issue to test for and correct if present. 
 Often times, controlling for time period effects will eliminate the possible presence of 
autocorrelation within a dataset.  Therefore, before formally testing for autocorrelation, 
presidential dummy variables were created in order to control for period effects (Stimson 1985).  
When creating time period dummy variables, not all time periods can be modeled because the 
matrix algebra will become singular.  Therefore, presidential dummy variables were created for 
all presidents except the one with the largest number of cases during his administration, which in 
this dataset was President Clinton (N = 8) (Gujarati 2002).  Doing so creates a baseline influence.  
This should control for period effects and also any effect that individual presidents had upon the 
dependent variable itself.  Controlling for period effects, however, does not always aptly correct 
autocorrelation.  Therefore, it is proper to test for autocorrelation formally. 
 Traditionally, to test for autocorrelation, the Durbin-Watson d test is employed.  The 
Durbin-Watson d statistic is calculated by use of the equation: 
d = tN=2 (êt - êt 1- )2 / tN=1 êt2
where et are the residuals (or disturbance terms) from the regression.  Generally, the closer that d 
approaches 2, the less evidence of autocorrelation.  For every regression, there is dL and a dU, 
which represent the lower and upper boundary of the Durbin-Watson critical values, which are 
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based upon the number of independent variables (k = 18) and the number of observations (N = 
337).  If the measure of Durbin-Watson d falls below the lower boundary, there is evidence of 
positive autocorrelation, if the d falls within the lower and upper boundary (called the zone of 
indecision), the test is inconclusive and further examination of These data is warranted, and if the 
d is above the upper boundary that the data does not experience positive, first order 
autocorrelation.  However, These data may be correlated in other ways. 
 The dL for this dataset is 1.575 and the dU is 1.967.  Thus, in order to determine if the 
dataset being used for this analysis contains no autocorrelation, its Durbin-Watson d must be 
greater than 1.967.  The actual Durbin-Watson d measure for this non-transformed dataset is 
1.522.  This shows a presence of positive autocorrelation since it falls below the dL value for this 
dataset. 
 In attempting to correct for positive autocorrelation, a lagged endogenous variable (that is 
t-1 of the dependent variable) was be added to the model.  Adding such a variable may control 
for the dependent variable’s inertia, which may be causing the autocorrelation (Lanier and Wood 
2001).  However, by including a lagged endogenous variable, the Durbin-Watson d test statistic 
can no longer be used to test for autocorrelation as one of the equations assumptions is that no 
lagged variables are present in the analysis.  Therefore, to examine if autocorrelation is still 
present in the model after the inclusion of the lagged endogenous variable, the Durbin-Watson h 
test was completed.  The equation for Durbin-Watson h is:  
)(1 2bSn
nrh −=  
where h is the Durbin-Watson h, n is the number of cases, r is the correlation coefficient for the 
first order lag, and  is the squared standard error of the regression coefficient.  The h measure 2bS
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is distributed like the t test of significance, so results falling within one standard deviation 
(t=1.96) do not show the presence of autocorrelation.  The Durbin-Watson h measure for this 
data including a lagged endogenous variable is 1.91.  Therefore, with the inclusion of a lagged 
endogenous variable, this dataset likely contains no significant autocorrelation. 
Multicollinearity 
 Multicollinearity occurs when two variables in the same model have a direct correlation 
or linear relationship between them with a measure of Pearson’s r or a Cramer’s v of greater than 
0.80.  When variables exhibit multicollinearity, their independent effects on the model may be 
biased downward in magnitude and the variances of the coefficient estimates may be inflated 
(Kennedy 2003).  Thus, it is important to identify variables that could possibly exhibit 
multicollinearity and attempt to correct for this statistical problem. 
 None of the variables that will be used simultaneously within the present model exhibit a 
relationship greater than 0.80.  The party identification variable correlates strongly with the 
Segal-Cover scores (Cramer’s v = 0.981); however, these variables will be used in separate 
models.  There are variables, however, that do exhibit a relationship of greater than 0.70 as 
measured by Cramer’s v.  While this is below the traditional standard for multicollinearity, these 
pairs of variables should theoretically covariate.  Thus, it is theoretically consistent to attempt to 
solve this presence of possible multicollinearity. 
 The two variables that exhibit the possibility for multicollinearity are public opinion and 
armed conflict.  The correlation between public opinion and armed conflict (as measured by 
UCDP) is Cramer’s v = 0.739.  The correlation between public opinion and armed conflict (as 
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measure by COW) is Cramer’s v = 0.645.  Theoretically, these two variables should move 
together.  The “rally around the flag” literature describes just this relationship (Baker and ONeal  
2001; Lee 1977; Meernik 1995; Mueller 1973; Partell 1997).  When the United States is involved 
in armed conflict, the popularity of the president usually increases.  However, public opinion and 
armed conflict, while interrelated, may possibly have their own independent affects upon 
individual level decision-making as well.  For this reason, and also to control for the possibility 
of multicollinearity between the two variables, an interaction between public opinion of the 
president and armed conflict will be included in each model estimation. 
 An interaction of two variables is accomplished by multiplying their values together to 
form a new variable.  This new interaction between armed conflict and public opinion will 
accomplish multiple tasks.  By using the interaction in the model, it will control for the co-
variation between armed conflict and public opinion.  Indeed, while some authors have 
challenged the use of interactions with their level variables in models as a possible cause for 
multicollinearity, Brambor et al. (2006) challenge this assumption by showing that including 
both the interaction and the level variables in the same model can control for multicollinearity of 
the level variables while also assessing the impact of their co-variance upon the dependent 
variable.  Friedrich (1982) notes a similar finding.  As such, the inclusion of the interaction 
between public opinion and armed conflict will be used not only to control for the possible 
multicollinearity between the two variables, thus allowing for a more accurate assessment of 
their effects upon the model, the interaction will also allow an examination of the effect of the 
two variables together considering much literature has noted that public opinion moves in sync 
with armed conflict.  This may provide greater confidence in the findings and more 
generalizability of the findings. 
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Formal Model Testing 
 Now that the model has been examined and corrected for both the presence of 
autocorrelation and multicollinearity, it is now proper to formally test the model of individual-
level vote choice of U.S. Supreme Court justices in cases of presidential power.   A logistic 
regression will be utilized as the dependent variable is dichotomous.  The equation being used to 















 b1 = presidential approval rating 
 b2 = case type 
 b3 = justice party affiliation 
 b4 = nominating president 
 b5 = prior executive experience 
 b6 = litigant status of the president 
 b7 = presence of armed conflict 
 b8 = interaction of armed conflict and public opinion 
 The model will include nine independent variables which may to predict individual-level 
justice voting in cases of presidential power.  They are: the presence of armed conflict; the 
change in the public opinion of the president over a three-month time preceding the formal 
decision in the case; the interaction of armed conflict and public opinion; whether the case 
involves foreign or domestic issues, if the justice involved has had prior executive experience; 
whether the justice was nominated by the president involved in the case; the justice’s party 
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identification (or Segal-Cover score); the justice’s rural or urban origin; and, lastly, the 
president’s litigant status in the case being adjudicated.  Furthermore, there are nine presidential 
dummy variables that seek to control for period effects that may have occurred during each 
president’s administration.  Finally, a lagged endogenous variable will be included to control for 
autocorrelation within the model, as discussed. 
 The first two models estimated will have two alternative measures of the justice’s 
personal attributes.  Table 14 displays with party identification and rural or urban origins to 
measure personal attributes, while Table 15 displays the findings when the Segal-Cover scores 
are employed instead.  All other variables in Table 14 and 15 are the same.  Table 14 and 15 
examine individual level decision-making in presidential power cases overall.  That is to say 
cases are not sorted by case type.  This methodology is done to provide a clearer picture of the 
trend of decision-making in these cases overall. 
 Only three non-control variables (armed conflict, case type, and party identification) 
reach conventional levels of statistic significance (p<0.05).  Three other non-control variables 
(public opinion, public opinion and armed conflict, and nominated justice) approach statistical 
significance at the 0.1 level. 
 In terms of coefficient strength, both armed conflict and case type are larger in marginal 
effect that the other non-control variables substantially.  All estimators are signed in their 
hypothesized direction, except the interaction of armed conflict and public opinion.  A possible 
cause for this differently signed coefficient estimate is perhaps because while public opinion 
tends to increase shortly following the start of armed conflict yet over a longer period of time 
public opinion may fall as opposition to the armed conflict increases.  Explaining the marginal 
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effect (which is the percent likelihood that a one point increase in the independent variable will 
cause a one point increase in the dependent variable) (Gujarati 2002), the most substantial effects 
are again armed conflict and case type.26
Table 14 Logistic Regression of All Cases 
 Marginal Effect beta S.E. p. 
Armed Conflict 46.9 2.210 .779 .005
Public Opinion 1.7 .068 .038 .074
Armed*Opinion -3.2 -.129 .076 .089
Case Type -51.0 -2.538 .499 .000
Executive -0.4 -.160 .441 .971
Nominated 15.8 .731 .418 .080
PartyID -13.7 -.552 .177 .002
Rural/Urban -1.7 -.073 .373 .845
Respondent -1.4 -.063 .349 .856
Truman -64.7 -4.144 1.165 .000
Eisenhower -43.6 -1.914 .982 .051
Johnson -56.2 -2.848 1.176 .015
Nixon -65.6 -3.894 1.143 .020
Ford -37.6 -1.594 .949 .093
Carter -33.6 -1.399 1.050 .183
Reagan -9.4 -.393 .447 .379
Bush -6.6 -.278 1.078 .796
GWBush -71.2 -5.317 1.186 .000
Lagged DV 29.8 1.282 .306 .000
Constant 2.012 .660 .002
N = 337 Mean of the DV= .60  Std. Deviation of the DV= .491 
Nagelkerke r2 = .497 
-2 Log Likelihood = 295.436 
Percent Correctly Predicted = 80.4 






                                                 
26Marginal effect was calculated using the XPost excel sheet developed by Cheng and Long (2000), which follow 
procedures discussed in Long (1997).  
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 Table 15 Logistic Regression of All Cases Using the Segal-Cover Scores 
 Marginal Effect beta S.E. p. 
Armed Conflict 47.0 2.216 .796 .005
Public Opinion 1.5 .065 .037 .081
Armed*Opinion -2.8 -.115 .075 .126
Case Type -50.9 -2.526 .500 .000
Executive -4.2 -.176 .418 .673
Nominated 12.7 .576 .402 .152
Segal-Cover -35.3 -1.546 .541 .004
Respondent .03 -.013 .346 .970
Truman -64.6 -4.112 1.165 .000
Eisenhower -38.7 -1.652 .991 .095
Johnson -53.7 -2.621 1.184 .027
Nixon -65.4 -3.870 1.159 .001
Ford -37.9 -1.604 .942 .089
Carter -32.2 -1.334 1.025 .193
Reagan -10.5 -.441 .441 .317
Bush -4.2 -.178 1.090 .870
GWBush -71.7 -5.267 1.188 .000
Lagged DV 29.7 1.277 .305 .000
Constant 2.187 .616 .000
N = 337 Mean of the DV= .60  Std. Deviation of the DV= .491 
Nagelkerke r2 = .492 
-2 Log Likelihood = 297.283 
Percent Correctly Predicted = 79.8 
PRE = 20.6% 
 
 Comparing the finding reported in Tables 14 and 15, all coefficient estimates have 
remained signed in the same direction and retain a similar magnitude.  Examining specifically 
the comparison between the personal attribute measures, the Segal-Cover scores have a larger 
marginal effect upon than the dependent variable than does the combination of party 
identification and rural or urban origins, the traditional personal attribute model employed by 
Tate (1981) and Tate and Handberg (1991).  This finding was expected as the Segal-Cover 
scores are continuous measures ranging from zero to one, while party identification and rural or 
urban origins are simply ordinal variables.  Thus, because the Segal-Cover scores capture more 
 77
variance, it is theoretically consistent that they will have a larger marginal effect upon the 
dependent variable.  Therefore, for all further regressions the Segal-Cover scores will be used as 
the measure of personal attributes and ideology within the model. 
 The findings from Tables 14 and 15 tell us numerous things.  First, the presence of armed 
conflict does have a statistically significant effect on individual-level decision-making in cases of 
presidential power.  The presence of armed conflict alone increases the likelihood that an 
individual justice will vote for the president by 47% in both Table 14 and 15.  This means that 
the justices of the Supreme Court are strongly influenced by the presence of the United States 
being involved in armed conflict when deciding a case involving presidential power.  Also, as 
previous research has noted (e.g., King and Meernik 1999; Yates and Whitford 1998; Yates 
2002), justices are more likely to vote for the president in cases involving the president’s military 
or foreign power.  It appears thus, that consistently with the delegation of powers in the 
Constitution of the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that the president has more 
power in foreign policy than in domestic policy.  The estimates for public opinion do not reach 
conventional levels of statistical significance in either model and the marginal effect appears to 
be only a modest one.  The finding that public opinion does not have a statistically significant 
effect on individual-level justice voting in cases of presidential power is a departure from Yates 
and Whitford (1998) and Yates (2002).  In both studies, the researchers find public opinion to be 
statistically significant and to have a large effect on the dependent variable.  One possible 
explanation for the finding in this paper is the inclusion of armed conflict as a variable.  As 
indicated previously, the presence of armed conflict is typically followed by an increase in the 
president’s public opinion, therefore by including armed conflict as a variable it is theoretically 
consistent that public opinion would have a decreased effect upon individual justice voting.  
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Yates (2002) also finds litigant status to have a statistically significant association with 
individual justice decision making in cases of presidential power however, this study does not 
come to the same conclusion.  Whether the president appears before the Court as petitioner or 
respondent appears to have no statistically significant association with the justices’ votes. 
 Before considering the impacts of this model separately in domestic and foreign policy 
cases, it is important to determine if the magnitude of the armed conflict is associated with the 
decision making of the justices.  In order to do this, the model will be re-estimated with the 
inclusion of the armed conflict variable as measured Correlates of War database, instead of the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program.  The inclusion criteria for both data sets are similar except for 
their measure of body count.  The UCDP includes an occurrence of armed conflict if there have 
been more than 25 battle deaths in a single year.  The COW database, however, includes an 
occurrence of armed conflict if there have been more than 1000 battle deaths in a single year.  
Thus, within the dataset the occurrence of armed conflict is more prevalent when using the 
UCDP.  Specifically, armed conflict occurs in 18 of 38 cases when using the UCDP measure and 
in only 12 of 38 cases when using the COW measure.  Because of the way These data are 
collected by the UCDP and the COW database, all occurrences of armed conflict included in the 
COW measure are included in the UCDP. 
 The armed conflict measure in Tables 14 and 15 uses the UCDP, the more liberal 
measure of armed conflict.  Table 16 is identical to Table 15, except for the measure of armed 
conflict will now be calculated by the COW database.  This should make it possible to determine 
whether magnitude of the armed conflict effects justice decision making.  While body count may 
not be the most accurate way to determine the magnitude of an armed conflict, body count has 
traditionally been used in international conflict literature (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1993; 
 79
Singer and Small 1972).  The interaction of armed conflict with public opinion should 
theoretically tap approval of the war and measure magnitude in that way as well. 
Table 16 Logistic Regression of All Cases with Armed Conflict as Measured by CoW 
 Marginal Effect beta S.E. p. 
Armed Conflict 5.0 .221 1.407 .875
Public Opinion 0.7 .032 .030 .292
Armed*Opinion 0.9 .036 .115 .752
Case Type -44.3 -2.143 .460 .000
Executive -2.0 -.087 .406 .830
Nominated 8.6 .385 .390 .323
Segal-Cover -33.8 -1.480 .524 .005
Respondent 0.2 .011 .348 .976
Truman -46.2 -2.063 1.688 .222
Eisenhower 11.6 .544 .634 .390
Johnson -20.2 -.826 1.773 .641
Nixon -42.5 -1.834 1.422 .197
Ford -1.2 -.050 .673 .940
Carter -23.6 -.968 .826 .241
Reagan -4.6 -.197 .423 .641
Bush 37.3 2.507 1.428 .079
GWBush -47.6 -2.127 1.473 .149
Lagged DV 32.2 1.392 .295 .000
Constant  1.803 .579 .002
N = 337 Mean of the DV= .60  Std. Deviation of the DV= .491 
Nagelkerke r2 = .462 
-2 Log Likelihood = 308.914 
Percent Correctly Predicted = 79.2 
PRE = 20.0% 
 
 When comparing Tables 15 and 16 armed conflict loses statistical significance, when its 
measured by the COW database.  Furthermore, its marginal effect its decreases to 5.0% (when 
measured by COW) from 47.0% (when measured by UCDP).  Armed conflict as measured by 
the UCDP, which reaches statistical significance, includes some incidents that would not be 
considered publicly salient such as the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954 and 1958 and the nationalist 
uprising in Puerto Rico in 1950, among others.  It is important to note, however, that Supreme 
Court justices are political elites, and as such, may be more aware of political happenings 
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throughout the world than non-elites.  It would appear as though individual justices are affected 
by armed conflict however, the magnitude of the armed conflict does not statistically influence 
their decision-making.  The COW measure of armed conflict does not affect the other variables 
in the model that greatly, the sizes of the coefficients only change moderately.  Thus, for the 
purpose of this study, armed conflict as measured by the UCDP will be used for the remainder of 
the study as its coefficient estimate is statistically significant. 
 One important factor remains the same in all the regressions estimated to this point: case 
type has the largest effect on individual level justice decision-making.  This result means that 
when justices approach a presidential power case, the largest factor that weighs how they will 
decide is whether the case references the president’s domestic power or the president’s foreign 
and military power.  This result could also mean that justices approach the decision making 
process of domestic case differently that foreign.  Since the Constitution of the United States 
grants the president his greatest nexus of power in foreign and military affairs, perhaps there is 
little else for justices to consider in these cases.  In domestic cases, however, the president’s 
powers would be more malleable and less concrete.  Therefore, when justices consider domestic 
cases, it would seem likely that other extra-legal and extra-attitudinal factors may have an effect 
upon their decision making. 
 In order to make this examine this possibility, two separate models were estimated: one 
for domestic cases and one for foreign/military.  The domestic model includes 198 votes to 
analyze; the foreign model 144.  The model for each contains the same variables as previous 
models except case type, which is the selection variable for each model.  Also, in each model, 
certain presidential dummy variables were excluded from the analysis because they were 
constant within the model, thus providing no variance to test. 
 81
Table 17 Logistic Regression of Only Domestic Cases 
 Marginal Effect beta S.E. p. 
Armed Conflict 52.7 2.347 .898 .009
opinion 6.2 .262 .132 .047
Armed*Opinion -7.6 -.351 .166 .034
Executive -19.3 -.805 .659 .222
Nominated 15.4 .623 .533 .242
SegalCover -25.3 -1.043 .726 .150
Respondent -7.1 -.284 .519 .584
Eisenhower -33.2 -1.565 1.162 .178
Nixon -56.0 -3.571 1.295 .006
Ford -36.1 -1.761 1.050 .093
Carter 32.9 1.474 1.865 .429
Reagan 0.4 .013 .600 .983
Bush -6.2 -.253 1.224 .836
Lagged DV 51.2 2.270 .443 .000
Constant -1.126 .600 .061
N = 194 Mean of the DV = .49 Std. Deviation of the DV = .501 
Nagelkerke r2 = .614 
-2 Log Likelihood = 145.292 
Percent Correctly Predicted = 86.2 
PRE = 34.8% 
 
 This model in Table 17 provides the first statistically significant coefficients for public 
opinion of the president and the interaction of that opinion with armed conflict within this study.  
This finding means that in domestic cases, public opinion trend of the president has a statistically 
significant effect on individual-level justice decision making.  This supports of the findings of 
Yates and Whitford (1998) and Yates (2002).  The interaction of armed conflict and public 
opinion has a negative effect on the model, possibly because as armed conflict continues through 
time, it has a possible negative effect upon public opinion, as seen during the Vietnam War.  It is 
also important to note that the coefficient for the Segal-Cover scores do not reach statistical 




 Table 18 Logistic Regression for Only Foreign/Military Cases 
 Marginal Effect beta S.E. p. 
Armed Conflict -65.6 -4.149 1.637 .011
Opinion -0.8 -.051 .097 .600
Armed*Opinion -0.1 .003 .180 .987
Executive -0.6 -.045 .609 .942
nominated 9.8 .823 .901 .361
SegalCover -23.9 -1.531 .874 .080
respondent -5.9 -.406 .609 .505
Truman 9.9 .827 1.684 .623
Johnson 22.0 2.806 1.933 .147
Carter 6.4 .508 3.119 .871
Reagan -38.6 -2.044 1.199 .088
Lagged DV -7.8 -.572 .540 .290
Constant 4.528 1.251 .000
N = 143 Mean of the DV = .73 Std. Deviation of the DV = .443 
Nagelkerke r2 = .375 
-2 Log Likelihood = 122.690 
Percent Correctly Predicted = 80.3 
PRE = 7.1% 
 
 Only one variable in the foreign model reaches statistical significance: armed conflict.  
However, its coefficient is signed in the opposite direction as hypothesized.  This means that 
during foreign/military cases, the presence of the U.S.’s being involved in armed conflict 
actually increases the likelihood individual justices will vote against the president.  Only the 
Segal-Cover scores approach conventional levels of statistical significance, as shown in Table 
18.  In foreign/military cases, the most important factor explaining the dependent variable is the 
presence of armed conflict. 
 When comparing the models estimated separately for domestic and foreign/military 
cases, some distinctly interesting occurrences emerge.  Among domestic cases, the public 
opinion trend of the president, and the interaction of armed conflict and public opinion become 
statistically significant.  This means that when the justices consider domestic power cases 
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involving the president, they are more attuned to extra-attitudinal and extra-legal factors.  These 
variables do not reach conventional levels of statistical significant for foreign/military cases.  In 
foreign/military cases, only one variable reaches statistical significance, which may possibly 
mean that justices consider very few factors when considering foreign cases because of the 
considerable constitutional power given to the president in foreign and military issues.  Most 
importantly, when separating the model by case type, the presence of armed conflict has 
dramatically different effects upon the model.  Within domestic cases, it has a statistically 
significant, positive effect.  This means that when the justices are considering a domestic power 
case, the presence of armed conflict increases the likelihood that will decide in favor of the 
president which supports the findings of Epstein et al. (2005).  However, a similar association is 
not present among foreign/military cases.  In fact, the opposite result emerges.  Among 
foreign/military cases, the presence of armed conflict increases the likelihood the justices will 
decide against the president.  This relationship was not hypothesized, and contradicts much of 
the rally around the flag literature. 
 The model predicts individual level votes quite well.  The model contained in Table 15, 
which analyzes individual voting without separating the model by case type, accurately predicts 
79.8 percent of the justices’ voting.  This is an improvement of 20.6 percent over the 59.2 
percent baseline.  Table 17, which only contained domestic cases, accurately predicted 86.2 
percent of the votes, which is a 34.8 percent increase over the 51.3 percent baseline.  Table 18, 
which was estimated for only foreign and military cases, accurately predicted 80.3 percent of the 
individual votes, which is a 7.1 percent increase over the 73.2 percent baseline.  This only 
moderate increase in the predictive accuracy may be because of the larger likelihood that the 
president will win cases involving foreign and military powers. 
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 When examining the Nagelkerke R2 measures a similar trend emerges as with the percent 
correctly predicted.  Nagelkerke R2 was used to evaluate model performance, and while 
calculated differently, it should be interpreted like an R2 measure in an OLS regression in terms 
of strength (Gujarati 2002).  Nagelkerke R2 ranges from 0 to 1 but, unlike the R2 statistic used in 
OLS regression, the Nagelkerke R2 is not a percent reduction of error measure and should not be 
interpreted as one.  In Table 15, the Nagelkerke R2 is .492 meaning that the variables have a 
moderate to strong effect upon the model.  In Table 17, the Nagelkerke R2 is .614, which means 
that for domestic cases the model performs quite well.  In Table 18, however, the Nagelkerke R2 
is only .375 which shows a weak to moderate model.  Again, this can possibly be explained by 
the consideration that justices give foreign/military cases when deciding in favor of the president. 
Summary 
 The analyses completed in this Chapter have shown that justices consider extra-
attitudinal and extra-legal factors when making decisions involving cases of presidential power.  
Furthermore, it has shown that the presence of armed conflict has a statistically significant effect 
upon individual-level justice decision making.  In the aggregate model, all coefficients were in 
their hypothesized directions.  Furthermore, the only two variables that reached statistical 
significance consistently were armed conflict and personal attribute variables (either party 
identification or the Segal-Cover scores).  The results of this examination led support to H3 and 
H7 in the aggregate.  In domestic cases, H1 and H7 cannot be rejected.  In foreign cases, however, 
while the estimate of armed conflict is statistically significant, it is not in its hypothesized 
direction.  Thus, the effect of armed conflict upon the individual level decision-making of the 
justices is dependant upon what type of case the Court is hearing.  In domestic cases, the 
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presence of armed conflict is associated with the increased likelihood that a justice will cast a 
vote in favor of the president, while in foreign and military cases, the presence of armed conflict 
is associated with the likelihood that a justice with vote against the president.  This finding 
contradicts previous research which argues that the presence of armed conflict increases support 
for the president.  The next Chapter will develop theoretical reason why the presence of armed 
conflict is associated with the increased likelihood that justices will vote against the president in 
foreign and military cases. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 The relationship between the presidency and Congress has been an area of frequent 
research (e.g., Bond and Fleisher 1980; Covington et. al 1995; Cronin 1980; Fisher 1994; 
Meernik 1995; Rivers and Rose 1985; Schlesinger 2004; Wildavsky 1966, 1989), as has the 
relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress (e.g., Clark and McGuire 1996; 
Handberg and Hill 1980; Hausegger and Baum 1999; Ignagni and Meernik 1994; Marshall 1989; 
Meernik and Ignagni 1995); however, the relationship between the Supreme Court and the 
presidency is an area which has only recently (with the emergence of the separation of powers 
model) begun to be examined with sophisticated quantitative analyses (King and Meernik 1999; 
Yates and Whitford 1998; Yates 2002).  The U.S. Supreme Court and the presidency both have 
extremely limited powers constitutionally, unlike their congressional colleagues which receive 
the wealth of the power from the Constitution.  Therefore, an examination of how they interact 
directly with their policy-making roles may be quite elaborative. 
 This study departs from the current dominant paradigm within the field of judicial 
politics, the attitudinal model (Segal and Spaeth 1993, 2002).  As previous researchers have 
argued, the attitudinal model, which seeks to predict individual level justice voting solely on the 
basis of individual ideology, is too simplistic to fully account for the decision-making process of 
each justice (Mishler and Sheehan 1993, 1996; Yates and Whitford 1998; Yates 2002).  The 
attitudinal model, however, does have strong predictive powers, and, as such, cannot be fully 
discarded.  What Mishler and Sheehan (1996:198) describe as the “naïve attitudinal model” is a 
starting point for more thorough examinations of individual-level decision making of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
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 This analysis, beginning with the attitudinal model as a theoretic starting point, 
hypothesized that because of the highly salient nature of the type of cases being examined, a 
more interactive model of decision making needed to be employed.  The “separation of power” 
literature is instructive concerning how to model decision-making in cases in which another 
branch of government is involved (Epstein and Knight 1998).  Operating from a very basic game 
theoretical approach, this work makes the assumption was made that some individual justices 
may take into consideration other non-attitudinal factors, directly and indirectly, that were related 
to the case they were deciding.  Therefore, while beginning with the attitudinal model, it was 
expected that other extra-attitudinal and extra-legal factors may affect the individual justice’s 
decision making. 
 The research done herein completed was part replication, part refinement.  This study 
was modeled after the previous research of Yates and Whitford (1998) and Yates (2002).  Yates 
and Whitford (1998) examined the individual-level decision making of U.S. Supreme Court 
justices in cases of presidential power from 1949 to 1993 (N=32).  While this research tried to 
exactly replicate the cases used in their research by following the same coding rules, there were 
substantial differences partially because Yates and Whitford did not supply a case list.27  As 
such, this research is more readily verifiable than that of Yates and Whitford.  Besides extending 
the time line of analysis through 2005, another explanatory variable was included in the analysis: 
the presence of armed conflict. 
 Mishler and Sheehan (1993, 1996) argued that in salient cases, individual justices may 
consider public opinion when making their decisions.  Yates and Whitford (1998) and Yates 
                                                 
27 The appendix contains a list of cases, the votes of which are examined herein. 
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(2002), building upon previous work, hypothesized that in Supreme Court cases which involved 
the president justices would be more likely to examine the public support of the president than 
the public support of the issue being adjudicated.  Since this study in large part replicated the 
work of Yates (2002), it included a similar measure of public opinion of the president that sought 
to predict decision making of the individual justices. 
 Wildavsky (1966, 1989) was the first researcher to articulate the “two presidencies” 
thesis, which argued than the president could expect to be more successful with Congress in 
foreign policy because a considerably larger amount of power was constitutionally delegated to 
the president in this field as compared to domestic policy.  Building upon this theory, King and 
Meernik (1999) examined the number of cases that dealt with foreign policy powers, and the 
president’s success rate in those cases.  They found that throughout the history of the Court, the 
president won his cases the majority of the time; however, in cases that dealt with foreign policy 
issues, he was substantially more successful.  Yates (2002) hypothesized that when individual 
justices heard cases involving the foreign policy powers of the president, they would be more 
likely to rule in his favor.  This analysis made a similar assumption. 
 Researchers have long hypothesized that because of patronage, justices will vote in 
accordance with their nominating president’s principles and, as such, if when the president 
appears before the Court, he should reasonably expect his nominees to support his  (Dahl 1957; 
Funston 1975; Norpoth and Segal 1994).  Tate (1981) and Tate and Handberg (1991) 
hypothesize that besides patronage, justices may vote consistently with their nominating 
president’s ideologies because it is likely that the president nominated an ideological match to 
himself.  Therefore, this analysis included a dichotomous variable to assess the extent to which a 
justice ruled in favor of his nominated president. 
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 Ducat and Dudley (1989) and Yates and Whitford (1998) argued that a justice having 
previous executive experience at the state or federal level would perhaps cause them to be more 
likely to rule in favor of presidential power.  Tate (1981) and Tate and Handberg (1991) found 
that previous judicial experience and previous prosecutorial experience could affect decision 
making as well.  Therefore, in this research a dichotomous variable was included to test whether 
previous executive experience has an affect on individual-level decision making. 
 Yates (2002) hypothesized that whether the president appeared before the Court as 
petitioner or respondent may have affect a justice’s decision making.  He argued that normally 
the Court has discretion when deciding what cases to grant certiorari.  However, in highly salient 
cases, the decision to hear a case is not completely up to the Court as external pressures may 
dictate action.  Presidential power is one instance of these highly salient cases.  In cases that 
involve presidential power, Yates (2002) argues that the Court prefers a situation where the 
Court can rule simultaneously with the decision of the lower court and for the president.  As 
such, in this analysis it was expected that the president would be more likely to win if he 
appeared before the Court as respondent. 
 Researchers in the congressional politics field have often used the “rally around the flag” 
theory to explain interaction between the Congress and the president during times of armed 
conflict (Baker and Oneal 2001; Lee 1977; Mueller 1973); however, little research has been 
conducted on the effect armed conflict may have on U.S. Supreme Court decision-making.  
Borrowing from the “rally around the flag” literature, this research hypothesized that the 
presence of armed conflict at the time of a Supreme Court decision would increase the likelihood 
that the justices would decide in favor of the president.  Epstein et. al (2005) argue that armed 
conflict is directly related to decision making in cases which are not related to the war (domestic 
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cases), but does not have a statistically significant effect for cases that are related to the war 
(foreign cases).  Epstein et al. (2005) examined all cases from 1941 to 2002, while this study 
only analyzed cases which involved presidential power from 1949 to 2005. 
 Therefore, starting from the “naïve attitudinal model,” this study built a more 
theoretically complete model to predict individual level decision-making of the U.S. Supreme 
Court justices in cases of presidential power.  By assessing the effect of not only ideology, but 
also presidential approval rating, case type, presidential nomination, prior executive experience 
of the justice, litigant status of the president, and the presence of armed conflict, it was hoped 
that cleared picture of how justices behaved in cases of presidential power would be achieved.   
Findings and Theoretical Explanations 
 The overall results confirmed most of the findings of the literature, but contradicted some 
of them as well.  Contradicting the work of Yates and Whitford (1998) and Yates (2002), in this 
analysis public opinion of the president only reached statistical significance once, in the subset of 
domestic cases.  Yates and Whitford (1998) found public opinion of the president (measured in 
the same way as the current analysis) to be the third largest predictor of individual-level votes 
behind only case type and ideology.  Public opinion of the president consistently reached 
statistical significance in each of their analyses, while in the current examination it reached 
statistical significance in only one of the subsets of cases (domestic).  Furthermore, in the current 
analysis public opinion, when statistically significant, was not a substantial predictor of 
individual-level justice voting.  A one point increase in public opinion only increased the 
likelihood a justice would vote for the president in domestic cases by 6.2 percent.  When 
compared with other variables that attained statistical significance in the model, this performance 
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is not impressive.  When considering the presence of armed conflict increases the likelihood a 
justice will vote for the president by 52.7 percent, a 6.2 percent increase (the smallest statistically 
significant increase in the model) is not as substantial as one would expected from Yates and 
Whitford’s research. 
 There are numerous possible explanations for the small impact of public opinion within 
this analysis.  As mentioned before, the current analysis, while modeled after the research of 
Yates and Whitford (1998) and Yates (2002), was unable to completely replicate the work 
because of the lack of a case listing provided in either work.  As such, the two studies case 
selection may differ drastically.  A more theoretical reason for the lack of performance by public 
opinion in this model could be the inclusion of an armed conflict variable in the present analysis.  
Armed conflict and public opinion of the president are known to covary, as explained by the 
“rally around the flag” literature (Baker and Oneal 2001; Lee 1977; Mueller 1973).  Furthermore, 
in this analysis, the two variables were tested for multicollinearity, and while they did not reach 
the critical value (0.80 η), it was rather high (.739 η).  Despite the presence of a control variable 
(in the form of an interaction between public opinion and the presence of armed conflict), armed 
conflict could serve to ultimately mute the effect of public opinion on individual level decision-
making.  Also conflicting with the findings of Yates (2002) is the failure of the litigant status of 
the president to ever reach statistical significance.  There is no theoretic reason why these results 
should differ from the results of Yates (2002); therefore, this discrepancy may arise because of 
differing case selection. 
 Another variable that failed to reach statistical significance herein is the presence of a 
justice nominated by the president who is party to the case being considered.  Ducat and Dudley 
(1989) found this variable to reach statistical significance in their analysis of Federal Appeal’s 
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Court justices.  Yates and Whitford (1998), replicating the work of Ducat and Dudley on the 
Supreme Court level, however did not find the justice’s nominating president to be a statistically 
significant predictor of individual level voting.  Tate (1981) and Tate and Handberg (1991) note 
that while there is a possibility of patronage between a justice and his nominating president, 
another possible explanation for a justice ruling consistently with the policy initiatives of a 
president (or in this case for the president) is because a president will traditionally nominate a 
justice who has a similar ideology to him, thus assuring that the justice will vote consistently 
with the ideology of the president.  In this analysis, this could mean that the variation expected 
from the nominating president variable has been absorbed by the inclusion of a variable 
measuring the ideology of the individual justice. 
 The presence of previous executive experience variable also did not reach conventional 
levels of statistical significance within this model.  Ducat and Dudley (1989) in their analysis of 
Federal Appeal’s court justices and Yates and Whitford (1998) in their analysis of Supreme 
Court justices did not find this variable to be a statistically significant predictor of individual 
level justice voting in cases of presidential power either.  While Tate and Handberg (1991) find 
previous judicial experience to be a significant predictor of individual justice voting, it appears 
that previous executive experience does not have a similar effect. 
 Three variables did consistently reach conventional levels of statistical significance: 
justice ideology, case type, and the presence of armed conflict.  Justice ideology has traditionally 
been seen as the cornerstone of predicting justice voting since the emergence of the judicial 
behavioralists (Schubert 1965, 1974).  While it is not the only factor to consider when 
considering the policy outputs of judges (Mishler and Sheehan 1993, 1996; but see Segal and 
Spaeth 1992, 2002), it is the point from which most analyses of individual level justice voting 
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begin.  The finding that ideology is a strong predictor of individual level justice decision-making 
in cases of presidential power is therefore terribly surprising.  More liberal justices are strongly 
associated with voting against presidential power.  This is theoretically explained by the 
coalescing of elites within the Democratic Party (at least during this period of analysis) an 
aversion to broad extensions of power of the president.  Democrats began to see the power of the 
president as something that needed to be checked in the wake of the Vietnam War and Watergate 
(Schlesinger 2004; Thomas and Pike 1996).  Thus, in the Supreme Court, it is theoretically 
consistent to find the more liberal judges (those traditionally associated with the Democratic 
Party) to be more likely to vote against the president in these cases.   
 The theoretical reasoning behind the statistical significance of case type when analyzing 
individual-level justice voting dates to the inception of the United States constitutional 
democracy.  The United States constitution specifically sets forth that the president has more 
substantial powers in the realm of foreign policy than in that of domestic.  It would be 
theoretically consistent that the Supreme Court’s members would recognize and act in 
accordance with this distinction.  Therefore, the finding that a justice is more likely to vote for 
the president if the case references his foreign policy powers is to be expected and confirms the 
findings of King and Meernik (1999), Yates and Whitford (1998), and Yates (2002).  When case 
type was included in the model and not used as a selection variable, its marginal effect 
consistently outperformed all other variables contained within the model.  In the aggregate, if the 
case being considered involved presidential foreign policy powers, a justice was approximately 
50 percent more likely to rule in favor of the president.  This finding has two important 
implications.  First, the attitudinal model, as Segal and Spaeth (1992, 2002) describe it, does not 
completely account for the variation in individual level justice voting in cases of presidential 
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power.  Case type, an extra-attitudinal factor, is a statistically significant predictor of individual 
level voting as well as the presence of armed conflict.  If the “naïve attitudinal model” were 
correct, variables that did not measure ideology would not have reached statistical significance.  
Second, ideology does not even have the largest marginal effect upon the model.  Case type 
outperforms ideology in terms of predictive capability.  Therefore, while ideology is an 
important consideration for any analysis of Supreme Court decision-making, it is a starting point, 
but not the only point. 
 The presence of armed conflict variable, while outperforming the expectations of this 
researcher, still presents quite a puzzle to be explained.  In the aggregate, the results were as 
hypothesized: the presence of armed conflict increases the likelihood a justice will vote in favor 
of the president.  In terms of marginal effect, the presence of armed conflict increases the 
likelihood a justice would vote for the president by 47 percent, which is only outperformed in 
Table 15 by case type, and then only marginally.  This finding in the aggregate lends support to 
the argument that the “rally around the flag” literature can be translated seamlessly to the judicial 
politics field.  When sorting by case type, however, the effect of the presence of armed conflict is 
modified. 
 In domestic cases, the presence of armed conflict performed as was hypothesized: the 
presence of armed conflict means that individual justices are more 52.7 percent more likely to 
rule in favor of the president.  However, the same trend is not present among the foreign/military 
cases.  In those cases, the presence of armed conflict means that individual justices were 65.6 
percent less likely to vote for the president.  These findings are comparable to those of Epstein 
et. al (2005), with one important difference.  While Epstein et. al conclude that the presence of 
armed conflict was strongly associated with increased conservatism among cases not related to 
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the war, they found no significant effect between armed conflict and those cases related to the 
war.  In the present analysis, not only was there a significant effect between armed conflict and 
justice decision-making in foreign/military cases, but it was a negative effect, meaning that in 
foreign/military cases that were ruled upon during times of armed conflict individual justices 
were more likely to rule against the president. 
 Theoretically, this presents a conundrum.  The “rally around the flag” literature describes 
a situation in which the president experiences an increase in his political capital as a result of the 
United States, being involved in an armed conflict.  This means that in both the domestic and 
foreign policy cases, the president should experience a situation where he is freer to implement 
his policy initiatives.  Therefore, especially in the realm of foreign/military powers, one would 
expect the presence of armed conflict to increase the likelihood of the president’s winning 
individual level votes before the Supreme Court.  Noting the work of Schlesinger (2004) and 
Thomas and Pika (1996), elite Democrats have become wary of the president’s war-making 
power.  Fisher (2004) acknowledges that while Democrats within Congress have been wary of 
the relatively unchecked power of the president, they have been unwilling to take action against 
the office excluding the War Powers Resolution, which while instituted to provide a check upon 
the military powers of the president, has been seldom used to do so.  Following this reasoning, it 
is theoretically possible that the Supreme Court is attempting to play a role in checking the 
actions of the president.  Fisher identifies that one of the reasons why members of Congress may 
refuse to check the presidency is that often their electoral success is closely tied to the president.  
Taking action against the president, especially during times of armed conflict where traditionally 
the public mood is supportive of the president, may have electoral consequences.  Justices on the 
Supreme Court, however, lack a similar electoral motivation.  Because of their life-tenure, the 
 96
justices are in a “safer” position from which to check presidential military power.  Furthermore, 
because of their position, political retribution from the executive is unlikely.  As such, it is 
theoretically possible that justices of the Supreme Court, because of their life tenure and lack of 
electoral accountability, are more structurally able to take actions to check the military powers of 
the president than their congressional brethren.  If this is the case, the continued expansion of the 
military powers under President George W. Bush may, if decided by the Court, may eventually 
lead to conflict between these two branches of government. 
Further Research 
 While this work introduced a new variable (the presence of armed conflict) into the study 
of the interaction between the Supreme Court and the presidency, there are additional strategies 
researchers could take to provide an even more theoretically satisfying understanding of their 
interaction.  While the magnitude of the armed conflict was examined as a possible effect that 
may influence individual level justice decision-making within this analysis, it was done by using 
body count as a proxy for magnitude of the armed conflict.  This process, while theoretically 
consistent with the international conflict literature, may not be the best way to examine 
magnitude with respect to the United States.  While body count certainly plays role in 
“magnitude,” it does not address public saliency or concern in the armed conflict.  While 
Vietnam had both public saliency and a large body count, it was largely seen in a negative light.  
However, World War II, which was also publicly salient and had a large body count, was seen in 
a positive way by the public.  Therefore, a measure of magnitude of armed conflict that rests 
upon body count as its sole proxy does not completely explain the complexities.  Therefore, a 
more robust measure of the magnitude of armed conflict may be developed that takes into 
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consideration not only body count, but also public saliency and public mood.  Furthermore, 
public mood during an armed conflict may not be a constant and should be accounted for within 
the measure. 
 The results of this study may be time bound.  As Schlesinger (2004) and Thomas and 
Pika (1996) acknowledge, following World War II, the Democratic Party became wary of the 
unchecked power of the presidency.  However, as Nelson (2003) points out, the Democrats under 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt celebrated a strong presidency.  While it could be true that attitudinal 
factors may still play a role in the time before this current analysis (pre-1949), the relative impact 
of the ideological make up may be less, or the direction of that impact may be reversed.  Also, 
the powers of the judiciary and the presidency have developed by an incremental process and, 
therefore, the interaction between these two branches may well be different in eras during which 
the relative power of both institutions is substantially different.  In fact, prior to the Judge’s Bill 
of 1925, the discretionary power of the Supreme Court was highly limited and as such the Court 
had a much different agenda than it does currently (Lanier 2003).  Before the Judge’s Bill, 
presidential power may have not been an issue that consistently reached the Court.  In addition, 
Lanier (2003) illustrates a decline in unaniminity on the Court in the 1940s.  Previously, 
dissenting votes were a rare occurrence.  As such, it would be theoretically consistent to assert 
that those cases that involved presidential power that reached the Court were typically not 
decided down ideological lines.  This would have substantial implications for the empirical study 
of the interaction between the Supreme Court and the presidency.  Therefore, further researchers 
should strive to extend this research by including other time periods in order to develop a clearer 
picture of the relationship between the Supreme Court and the president.  Furthermore, through 
the use of time series analysis, the theories generated in the study could be examined to see if 
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they are truly time bound.  King and Meernik (1999) examine the foreign policy cases of the 
president before the Supreme Court, but that analysis focuses on how the Court has ruled, but not 
why it has ruled that way. 
 While this analysis focuses on the direct interaction of the Supreme Court and the 
presidency through an analysis of those cases that appeared before the Court that involved 
presidential power, this is not the only venue in which these two institutions interact.  Yates 
(2002) also examines presidential success in two alternate venues before the Supreme Court: the 
executive bureaucracy and the president’s policy initiatives.  Alternately, Salokar (1992) 
examines the success of the Solicitor General, the president’s lawyer, before the Court.  To fully 
address the separation of power issues that arise when these two branches of government 
interact, a more thorough analysis of these addition cases needs to be undertaken.  Also, the work 
of Yates and Whitford (1998), which this work attempts to replicate, is a response to the work of 
Ducat and Dudley (1989), who examine the success of the president before the U.S. Courts of 
Appeal.  This area of examination is in due for a revisiting, and with the emergence of a readily 
available U.S. Court of Appeals database (Songer 1990), which includes cases decided from 
1925 to 1988, and has been recently updated; this research should be relatively straightforward to 
complete. 
Conclusion 
 This study set out to examine the interaction between the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
presidency.  Beginning from the assumption that the “naïve attitudinal model” was too simplistic 
to fully account for the variation in individual level justice decision-making, a more robust 
model was constructed using attitudinal, extra-attitudinal, and extra-legal factors to predict 
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individual justice behavior.  Operating from the theoretical construct of a “separation of powers” 
game, it was believed that in these highly salient cases while attitudinal factors would be 
important, other factors would also account for variation.  As expected, ideology and case type 
were statistically significant predictors of individual level justice voting.  The effect of armed 
conflict however was more substantial, and more puzzling, than expected.  It would appear as in 
the modern era Cicero’s maxim “inter arma silent leges” (during war, the law is silent) must be 
reconsidered.  In the post-World War II era, it appears that during war, the Constitution speaks 
with a distinctly louder voice.  
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APPENDIX A – CASE LIST 
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 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) 
Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954) 
Wiener v. U.S., 357 U.S. 349 (1958) 
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) 
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) 
New York Times v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971) 
U.S. v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)  
U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) 
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974) 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) 
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977)  
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) 
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) 
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) 
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982) 
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) 
Harlow & Butterfield v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)  
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S 919 (1983) 
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) 
Bowser v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) 
Skinner v. Mid-American Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989) 
Touby v. U.S., 500 U.S. 160 (1991) 
Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Noise Abatement, 501 U.S. 252 (1991) 
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) 
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993) 
Weiss v. U.S., 510 U.S. 163 (1994) 
Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994) 
Ryder v. U.S., 515 U.S. 177 (1995) 
Loving v. U.S., 517 U.S. 748 (1996) 
Edmond v. U.S., 520 U.S. 651 (1997) 
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) 
Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) 
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) 
American Insurance Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) 
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) 
 
The above cases are those contained within the analysis. 
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